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The major premise of this study is that a relationship exists
between International economic order, imperialism and unequal develop¬
ment.
The nature of this relationship is that the International economic
order is the legal political superstructure as well as the economic
arrangement that governs international political economy relations.
This economic arrangement was formed and structured at the end of the
second world war under the hegemony of the United States. The development
of this postwar international economic order was accompanied by economic
arrangements that were based on trade, aid, investment policies and
monetary system. These four functional areas were structured within the
framework of imperialist institutions like the IMF, IBRD and GATT. By
operating within the structure of these institutions the economic order
has become the major promoting and accelerating factor of imperialism
and subsequently of underdevelopment.
The study also suggests that of the four functional areas of the
economic order private foreign investment is the most powerful link between
imperialism and underdevelopment. This important role of foreign invest¬
ment is derived from the fact that it functions within the framework of
MNCs. And since the activities of MNCs touch every aspect of the national
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and international, social and politico-economic system, foreign invest¬
ment has become the international mechanism of control that organically
connects the two processes of development and underdevelopment.
The analysis of the demand for a NIEO reveals that the demand by
third world leaders was precipitated by two factors: the failure of
political independence to bring economic prosperity and their frustra¬
tion, in about two decades of largely fruitless efforts to obtain inter¬
national consideration and implementation of their proposals for
equitable distribution of international resources. The finding reveals
that despite the conflict on a NIEO there is no prospect that the NIEO
will be implemented. And if it does, it would not enhance the develop-
mentof third world peoples. Instead it will result in a new and more
advanced form of imperialist exploitation of the people through a new
unequal international divisio of labor and form of dependency that will
emerge. The reason is that an internal development geared to the NIEO
will strengthen the position of the priviledged dominant classes who are
in alliance with the monopolies of the center and subjugate the masses
furthe to capitalist exploitation and oppression.
The study concludes that underdevelopment can not be eliminated
through the diffusion of technology and institutional values from the
advanced capitalist countries. The process that will lead to genuine
development that is capable of creating the production base sufficient
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Preface
This study presents an interpretation and analysis of the phenomena
of international economic order and underdevelopment, ffy interest in the
study derives from a concern with the contemporary situation and the
future of the people of the underdeveloped world. The general under¬
standing of their situation is that third world peoples are technologi¬
cally backward people who live in poverty and persistent underdevelopment.
Yet, it has been widely acknowledged that the society in which they live
and the land on which they live and labor are endowed with both natural
and human resources. Why then are they poor and underdeveloped? And
what can be done to eradicate their underdevelopment?
In the search for an understanding of what can be done to eradicate
underdevelopment, I have come to the conclusion that one must as a rule
understand the causes of underdevelopment. Because it will not be
possible to contemplate bringing about fundamental change in any contem¬
porary situation without knowing how the situation came about. This
study is an attempt to xmderstand what causes underdevelopment, how it
is perpetuated, and what can be done to eliminate it.
The study only attempts to do the above task, it does not carry out
an extensive investigation of the class structure in third world countries,
as the latter will be required in order to formulate a correct strategy
and tactics that can lead to the liquidation of underdevelopment.
But our analysis of the phenomena of the international economic
order, capitalist imperialism and underdevelopment suggests that persistent
1
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underdevelopment derives from the nature of the socioeconomic and political
institutions of society. These institutional structures (in the history
of evolution and formations of all societies) are a product of historical
forces. Once the structures have come into being through the forces of
history they continue to perpetuate themselves (not in a vicious manner,
but) in a cumulative pattern—at least until a dialectical break occurs,
at which time new social forces characterized by the dictates of social
change emerges. What this means is that the two processes of development
and underdevelopment are products of the same historcial forces. In this
case the historical evolution and formation of capitalism on a world
scale. The reason why the phenomena which we now call underdevelopment
has come the characteristic features of the third world is that the process
of development in the latter was circumscribed, subjugated and conditioned
by the process of development in the now developed world.
After this process of underdevelopment has been set in motion by
the external social forces it assumed its own dynamics and continues to
perpetuate itself through internal social forces. Thus, in order to
reverse this cumulative process of underdevelopment a dialectic break with
the social forces that perpetuates underdevelopment is required. This
study is designed to reinforce the notion and also to emphasize the fact
that contemporary underdevelopment can only be liquidated through a
radical break with the international capitalist system, and internal
structural transformation of the socioeconomic and political institutions.
Any measure that falls short of the above two (such as the attended
phenomena of a new International economic order) is an attempt to deflect
attention away from the real issue of underdevelopment and to strengthen
the priviliedged positions of the dominant classes in the third world.
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As I have said earlier this study is a personal interpretation of
the main outlines of the progression of knowledge of the political
economy of development and underdevelopment; and in making this study a
reality many people that I have come across since my stay in the U.S.
have assisted me one way or another. Space limitations will not allow
me to mention their names Individually here, but I am grateful to all
of them. My whole view of the international economic order and its
relationship to underdevelopment has been influenced by Alix Paul. We
used to discuss most of the problems considered in this study while he
was on the faculty of Atlanta University. William B. Turner gave me
the encouragement and the initial financial support to start graduate
study. He insisted that I go to Atlanta University, I thank him very
much for his brotherly love, understanding and foresight. Shelby Lewis
is a true sister, but who never hesitates to take the role of a mother
whenever the situation calls for that and Mack H. Jones who is more so
an elder brother, guardian and leader rather than a boss have both
influenced my personal and intellectual development considerably.
I express my sincere appreciation and deep gratitude. Finally I owe
a prodigious debt of gratitude to Dorothy Stiney who has typed the first
and final draft of this thesis without charge. May all of the people
I have mentioned above know what they mean to me.
The entire study is dedicated to my brothers and sisters, the
African-Americans (including those that are dead, those that are living
and the unborn) whose consistent struggle against American capitalist
Imperialism has made it possible for those of us from the mother
continent to come and study in the U.S. All I can hope for is that
my personal and Intellectual development and life accomplishments can
be regarded by them and the people I have mentioned above as worthy
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of the sacrifices they have made, the assistance they gave, and the
opportunity they have afforded me.
INTRODUCTION
The issue of the international economic order has been the focus of
many social scientists in the past few years, especially these students
of international politico-economic relations on the one hand, and on the
other hand the actors of transnational organizations and transgovern-
mental elites. In a careful evaluation of the major writings on the
NIEO, one recognizes one commonality in all of the writings: nearly all
the writers/actors agreed that the Bretton Wood System that had func¬
tioned since the postwar period is inadequate to handle the economic
crisis that surfaced in the early 70s.
But not all the writers/actors (both from the developed and the
underdeveloped nations) are sure if the Bretton Wood System has totally
collapsed and should be replaced by a new system. Those who think that
the crisis is a permanent one which can only be resolved by evolving a
new system have no consensus about how to evolve the new world order.
And when the consensus seen to exist (probably as a result of the dilem¬
ma between reformism and social revolution) opinions differ on what
should be the form and content of the NIEO. Still many others argue
that the legal and politico-economic superstructure of the postwar order
can not be reformed or changed for a genuinely NIEO without any basic
change (similar to the crisis of the 1930s and the 40s) taking place.
5
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As a result of the above differences, which are due primarily to dif¬
ferences in theoretical approach, epistemological assumptions and polit¬
ico-ideological representations, three approaches or schools of thought
have emerged. The schools are: the globalist approach, the interdepen¬
dence approach, and the economic nationalist approach. Those approaches
emerged because of the need to fashion a new "development theory" that
will accommodate the economic crisis that occurred in the 70s. Despite
the differences in approaches between the three schools, they belong to
the same epistemological domain. This shall become clear as I explain
their basic assimiptlons and the strategy of action their theoretical
framework prescribed.
The globalist approach views the issue of a NIEO as a global issue.
It argues that the issue of a NIEO has both positive and negative ramifi¬
cations for the progress and development of the entire world. It points
out the danger of deepening underdevelopment to the progress of the ad¬
vanced capitalist countries. It argues that the development of the under¬
developed world is the responsibility of the advanced capitalist countries.
The globalist approach recognizes the inadequacies of the postwar economic
order, but argues that the advanced capitalist countries must evolve a
new system that will accommodate third world demands. It evokes a puri¬
tanical concept such as "justice" in appealing to the advanced capitalist
countries, and non-puritanical concepts such as "world citizens, "world
solidarity," "man common heritage," etc., in appealing to all nations to
cooperate. The approach rejects the themes of the NIEO because of third
worlds aspiration to control national soverignty and national resource.
It substitutes the Project of the Club of Rome; Reshaping the Interna-
7
tlonal Order for the NIEO. Among the others, we find. Tan Tinbergen (1976)
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as the leading figure of this school and the Trilateral Commission.
The interdependence approach is similar to the globalist approach. It
accepts the globalist analysis of the international politico-economic re¬
lations, but adds that the reformism of the international economic system
is desirable because no single country can survive independently without
cooperation and compromise. The school, which vacilitates between the
right wing and the left wing accepts the themes of the NIEO, but rejects
the notion of disengagement as a precondition for self-reliant develop¬
ment in the third world. This approach which is most comiaon among third
world theoreticians argues that the success of OPEC is an indication that
economic power has shifted to the third world. It rejects the notion of
dependency as a phenomena of the past. And advocates further intergra-
tion within the capitalist system as a means of achieving economic dev¬
elopment in the underdeveloped world. Within the school, we find, the
agenda of the NIEO, D. Goulet (1976), Samuel Parmar and All Mazrui in
G. Erb and V. Kallab's edition (1975), and C. F. Bergsten (1977).
The economic nationalist approach differs from the above two ap¬
proaches. It emerged in 1973 in the advanced capitalist countries as a
reaction of the OPEC success and the subsequent demiind for a NIEO. It
argues that the demand for a NIEO is a conspiracy by third world nations
against the "free world." It rejects the themes of the NIEO as an aspect_
For a detailed understanding of this school, see T. Tinbergen, Reshap¬
ing the International Order; A Report to the Club of Rome and "The Tri¬
lateral Commission "Monthly Review Vol. 29 No. 7 (Dec 1977) pp. 1-7.
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of third world conspiracy to get western countries to finance their devel¬
opment. The pioneer and leading proponent of this approach is C.F. Berg-
2
sten.
Before going into debate about the usefulness of the above approaches
in understanding the problematic of the international economic order, let
us identify their basic assumptions. Firstly, the assumption that under¬
development is an original stage ijhich every country must pass through in
its evolution from the precapitalist modes of production to full fledge
capitalism. Secondly, the assumption that the underdeveloped countries
lack the structural characteristics that make the transition from back¬
wardness to development in Europe and North America possible. Therefore,
the elimination of underdeveloped must come through the diffusion of
Institutional values from the advanced capitalist countries to the third
world. Thirdly, the assumption that the underdeveloped countries can de¬
velop viable economies within the framework of the international capital¬
ist system.
I have demonstrated in chapter five that these assumptions and many
others of the development theorist school lack historical verification
and logical consistency. In the meantime, it is sufficient to say that
the evolution of these assumptions give rise to the above various inter-
2
This school ofthought emerged with Bergsten's "The Threat From The
Third World" Foreign Policy, Summer, 1973, "The Threat is Real" Foreign
Policy, Spring, 1974 and "The Response to the Third World" Foreign Policy,
Winter, 1974-75. Bergsten's purpose was to arouse public opinion and the
government in the West to take drastic action against the third world,
such as the suggested arbltary invasion of the oil wells in the Middle
East in 1973. But as it becomes clear in the mid 70s that the economic
crisis in OECD countries was due primarily to the decline in the rate of
capital accumulation, unemployment and rising Inflation, the nationalist
school gradually moved into the interdependence school. This is exempli¬
fied by Bergsten's most recent work.
9
pretations of the international economic order, which consists in recog¬
nizing the symbiotic relationship between international economic order
and underdevelopment, but doing so in terms of the ideology of capita¬
lism. The globalist approach is a good example of this. While the the¬
oretical discussions recognize the socio-political factors which con¬
fronted the North-South debate on a new international economic order,
it confines all discussion of the international economic order to purely
ideological spheres. Thereby giving priority over economic determina¬
tion and the class struggle to political will in reshaping the interna¬
tional order.
The interdependence approach is also an explication of the ideol¬
ogies of capitalism. While it recognizes the dependency of third world
nations on the international economic system, and advocates reform of
the system, it argues elusively that advanced capitalism is interdepen¬
dent of periperal capitalism. But contrary to this illogical formula¬
tion Samir Amin argues that:
...the developed capitalist economies are indeed self-
reliant, althought not self-sufficient. In this case,
it makes sense to speak of interdependence - even among
unequals (for French capitalism is not the equal of
German or American capitalism). But the peripheral
capitalist economies have so far been externally oriented
and dependent, not interdependent.^
Thus, as a result of the normative assumptions that are rooted in
the capitalist ideology, and the theoretical approach geared toward the
3
S. Amin, "The NIEO" Monthly Review, Vol. 29, No. 3 (July-August
1977) p. 2.
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preservation of the international capitalism, a set of solutions that have
no relations to the elimination of underdevelopment emerged. I called the
solutions unrealistic because the theory that prescribed them can not be
anchored in concrete analyses of underdevelopment. Secondly, it calls for
a solution that will strengthen imperialism and the indigenous bourgeoisie
of third world nations. Such solutions Include an amelioration of the
asymetrlc international division of labor, the smoothing of the poverty of
the people of the underdeveloped nations through more aid, transfer of
technology, foreign investment, etc.
The inadequacies of the above solutions results from the theoretical
approach to the study of international economic relations. This theoret¬
ical approach Involves an analysis which separates the issue of the inter¬
national economic order from the international capitalist system. When
there S3nnbiotic relationship is recognized, the international economic
order is treated as the primary cause of underdevelopment. Instead of
analyzing the structure and developments of the world capitalist system
that produces the postwar economic order, the latter becomes focus of the
struggle against economic underdevelopment, and the economic crisis in
OECD countries.
Furthermore, the weaknesses and implications of the theoretical dis¬
cussions that do not treat the postwar economic order as an economic
Instance of the world capitalist system beg the question of underdevelop¬
ment. To beg the question of underdevelopment in this respect is to
assume that a specific instance of the world capitalist system can be
destroyed while preserving the system that produces it.
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The main defect which exist in the above approaches to the study of
international economic order and the solutions they perceived suggests
that a new theoretical approach that is anchored in concrete analyses of
of underdevelopment is needed. The reasons for this is twofold: "the
A
contours of the ideological discourse on" the NIEO have been establish¬
ed by the third world dominant classes. This ideology cannot be demys¬
tified simply by denouciation of the agenda of the NIEO. It requires a
theoretical analysis of the questions of international division of labor,
imperialism, dependency, the class composition in third world countries,
etc. Secondly, a new theoretical approach is needed as a tool of reflec¬
tion because of the social, political and cultural factors which con¬
fronted the issue of a NIEO. This theoretical approach must proceed in
such a way that it does not become a perspective that "historical reality
is forced to fit." Instead, it must proceed as a "step toward the com-
5
prehension of historical reality."
This, in effect, means that the analysis of international economic
order "must be started both historically and logically with the examina¬
tion and evaluation of...the capitalist world economy and international
6
division of labour." The theoretical approach must understand the phe-
4
M. Castells, The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach, (Mass: MIT
Press, 1977) p. 2.
5
C. K. Wilber, The Soviet Model and Underdeveloped Countries,
(Chapel Hill: The Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1969) p. 9.
6
T. Szentes, The Political Economy of Underdevelopment, (Budapest:
Akademial Klado Pub. House, 1976) p. 133.
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nomena of the international economic order and how it relates to the prob¬
lematic of both the underdeveloped and the developed world. By so doing,
one will be able to give a proper interpretation of underdevelopment




The laws of motion of underdevelopment are much more
widely and deeply rooted than the actual sphere of
underdevelopment in a given place and at a give time.
Therefore, the interpretation of underdevelopment
must necessarily include a historical and external
element which is originally inherent not only in
underdevelopment but also in development.®
Such a theoretical approach must comprehend the new international
economic order, first of all, as the objective product of world capital¬
ism which developed at a certain stage in the historical evolution and
expansion of monopoly capital. Secondly, it must assess the postwar
order, from the point of view that it has become "the promoting and ac-
9
celerating factor" of modern imperialism and as an international mech¬
anism of control. But only as an international mechanism of control
10











This international economic order or mechanism of control was estab¬
lished after the second world war under the hegemony of the U.S. But
prior to the emergence of this postwar order the materialization, in the
15th and 16th century, of the world-wide expansion of European capitalism
has incorporated the now underdeveloped world within the international
capitalist econcanic structure. This incorporation and the subsequent sub¬
jugation of their economic structure (through colonial plunder, conquest,
repression, etc.) had led to the installation of new productive activities
based on the needs of the international capitalist dominant powers. These
activities creates a structure of dependency^^ favorable to the continuous
reproduction of the as3mietric international politico-economic power rela¬
tions.
Hence, the postwar international economic order and the attending
phenomena of a NIEO must be seen within the historical evolution and dyna¬
mics of the world capitalist system.
Having said all the above as a methodological note, my proposition in
this study is as follows; the international economic order which was set
up at the end of the second world war with its four functional areas: aid,
trade, monetary system and investment policies form the basic conditioning
situation of underdevelopment. The legal and politico-economic super-
11
The structure and form of dependency has varied from period to
period. During the colonial period it was dependency based on trade
export monopolized by colonial power. Before the WWII, that is, toward
the end of the 19th century the expansion of capital from the center to
periphercy through investment was added to trade dependency. In the
postwar period a new type of dependence based on multinational corpo¬
rations was added to it. For further readings on this see Szentes ,
pp. 166-328.
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structure set up by western imperialism were designed to promote economic
progress and development among the advanced capitalist countries through
the expropriation of surplus value from the periphery of the internation¬
al capitalist system. Thus, the nations of the third world who became
functioning members of this postwar order, without a previous attempt to
internally transform their society and restructure their relationship
with the international capitalist system only accentuates the already
developed international division of labor and subsequently of the polit¬
ico-economic power relations.
Given the above propositions, and the tendency of international
capitalism to unlimited expansion and reproduction, it seems unlikely
that the present conflict between imperialism and the third world for a
NIEO will resolve in a NIEO favorable to genuine economic development in
the underdeveloped world. Against these odds, the demand for a NIEO
still assumed that reform or change, either in part or in whole, of the
international mechanism of control, (and not so much of the system that
produced these mechanism of control) will lead to the elimination of
economic underdevelopment in the third world.
But if history is the most adequate measure of human experiences, it
is highly improbable that the practical liquidation of underdevelopment
can be achieved through reform of the international capitalist system.
Just as economic development has never been achieved in any society through
the diffusion of capital from the international capital markets, the solu¬
tion to economic backwardness in the third world must come from within.
It will be a historical and illogical to expect that development can be
delivered from outside. The reason is that the practical elimination of
15
underdevelopment cannot take pice outside tke Instituion where its mani¬
festation have surfaced.
In view of this, I argue in the study that the proposals by the third
world ruling class aimed at reconstitution the world capitalist economic
order so that it can become a vehicle for development in the third world
is accommodation under new conditions. The reason for this is twofold.
Firstly the advocated goals of the NIEO are not likely to be met with the
proposed means. But if a as a result of future miracles some of the
demands of the NIEO are met, they will not enhance development of third
world peoples. Instead the NIEO will result in a new phase in the expan¬
sion of the world capitalist system. This phase will accelerate the estab¬
lishment of a new and more advanced form of capitalist exploitation of
third world peoples in the context of a new international division of
labor and thaiew form of dependency that will emerge. Secondly, the de¬
mand and plea for a NIEO that strongly emphasize association and partic¬
ipation within the structure of the international capitalist system re¬
flect the dynamic interests of third world ruling class. An genuine de¬
mand, designed to serve the general interests of third world peoples must
emphasize internal transformation of socioeconomic systems, and other
related measures that will reduce dependence on the International capitalist
economic structure.
For this reason, I also contend that the ideology of the NIEO that
is coated in anti-imperialist struggle by the third world ruling class
is a false ideology. The ideology is not only false, it is also bankrupt,
because, the imperialism which the third world ruling class are struggling
against would not have sustained Itself as a dominant force in
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the underdeveloped world were it not for support among the same client
classes in the underdeveloped nations who are now demanding a NIEO.
And they themselves as national oligarchies of perioheral capitalism
would fall one by one to national revolution if not for imperialism's
support.
The remainder of the study is an attempt to reflect and elucidate
on the polemics and scenarios, raised in this introductory chapter. In
chapter one, I provided, a descriptive analysis of the historical evolu¬
tion and structure of the postwar international economic order. The desc¬
riptive analysis shows that the postwar economic order has four function¬
al areas: aid, monetary syste, investment policies and trade. I explained
that these four functional areas are structured within the framework of
imperialist institutions such as the I.M.D., I.B.R.B.D. and GATT. Because
of this structure the international economic order has become the vehicle
for domination and exploitation of third world peoples.
In chapter two, I argue that of the four functional areas of the
postwar order, private foreign investment is most subtle and insidious
imperialist tool for expropriating surplus values from third world eco¬
nomies. I noted that private foreign investment has become the torch
bearer of modern imperialism and the necessary factor for the expansion
of the ihternational capitalist system. This important role of foreign
investment is exemplified by the fact that its operation touches every
concern of international and national politico-economic systems.
Through advertising, export of consumerism and commercialism foreign
investment control market place ideology, and mostly importantly the
17
social-cultural values that determine how people live.
Chapter three focuses on third world demand for a NIEO. I explained
that the conflict with imperialism for a NIEO results from the culmina¬
tion of series of historical factors. Such as the failure of political
independence to bring economic property; the failure of the first U.N.
development decade to stimulate economic growth; the end of the cold war
and the subsequent shift from the bipolar nuclear crisis of that period
to the multipolar economic crisis of the 60s; the collapse of the Bretton
Wood System due to the economic crisis in OECD countries; the creation of
UNCTAD in the early 60; the increase in external financial debt of third
world countries and the burden the external debts and the debts service
place on underdeveloped economies; the defeat of Imperialism in Vietnam;
and the outbreak of the 1973 Middle East War and the success of OPEC to
win concessions from multinational oil corporations.
In chapter four, I indicates that the NIEO represents a fundamental
conflict between third world peoples and imperialism. This conflicts,
as I demonstrated in the study, results from third world's frustration,
in about two decades of largely fruitless efforts to obtain internation¬
al considerations and implementation of their proposals for fairer inter¬
national distribution of resources. I pointed out that the demand for a
NIEO started with concilitory attitude in the 40s, but this changed into
a more militant stance in the 70s due to deepening crisis of underdevel¬
opment in the third world. The chapter also explains that the contours
of the ideological discourse of the NIEO has its roots in the Raul
Pebisch doctrine in the AOs, and the non-aligned movement that started
in Bandung. I noted that the demands of the NIEO (i.e., the demand for
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for third world participation and influence in the operation of interna¬
tional politico-economic systems and more benefits for the third world
from the operation of the system) can not lead to the attainment of
either a self-reliant development on an autonomous capitalist develop¬
ment .
In the assessment of the NIEO, its probable impact on third world
development and implications for the international politico-economic
system, I note that the development of autonomous capitalism (or so¬
cialist self-reliant development) as evisaged by the third world demand
for a NIEO is highly improbable. The impossibility of this strategy,
as I explained, is due to historical facts. This fact of history is
that there are development stages which accounted for development of
societies based on a dynamic laws of capital accumulation and produc¬
tion. The development of these stages in the third world have been
circumscribed and subjected by the dynamic laws of capital accumula¬
tion in the advanced capitalist center. Thus, to comtemplate an auton¬
omous capitalist industrialization in the third world, a new social
formation must exist that those countries of the third world can subju¬
gate.
I then evaluate the principal outcome of the NIEO: namely, the
Jamaica reform of the IMF in 1974, the Paris Conference on Economic
Cooperation and the UNCTAD Conference in 1976. The evaluation shows
that the three forums were unable to Implement the proposals of the
NIEO due to imperialism's rejection of themes of the NIEO.
This chapter further explains that the NIEO, if for some historical
tendencies is implemented, would not enhance the development of third
world peoples. Instead, it would result in further exploitation of the
19
peoples within the context of a new international division of labor, and
a new form of dependency. For similar reasons I argue that the NIEO
would not eliminate the persistence poverty in the third world because
the pyramid class composition in most third world countries do not allow
the trickling down of economic surplus to the masses. Whether the sur¬
plus is expropriated from the bottom of society or from the internation¬
al economic system, the ruling class and the top 10-20 percent of the
population are the sole appropriation of all the surpluses.
It is in view of the above discussions, that 1 state in the conclu¬
sion in chapter six that the precondition for economic development in
the underdeveloped world lies within the national system. Such precon¬
ditions must involve the radical transformation of the socio-economic
structure, a change in the class composition and the adoption of devel¬
opment strategy geared towards socialist self-reliant development.
Before beginning, I would like to state that this study does not
pretend to examine all aspects of the international economic order and
its relationships to Imperialism and unequal development; in particular,
a closer study of the above, which must entail a rigorous analysis of
class relations in both the periphery and the center of the world capi¬
talist system, the place and role of ideology, the phenomenon of depen¬
dency, etc., are not thoroughly dealt with in the study. I also real¬
ized that I have tried to cover an area which requires sound knowledge
of economics, and in trying to make up for my deficlences might have
oversimplified in few cases. I note the above in order to warn against
the following; firstly, that there is much more underlying the formula¬
tions attended to in this introduction than the study can account for.
20
Secondly, that this study rather than being a critical and dialectical
analysis, that is, a consistent, emphasizing explanation and criticism
in the Fanonist traditon, tends to be historical, analytical and struc¬
tural. Finally, that there is deviation from the prevalent mythodology
in the bourgeois social sciences that says the task of social scientists
is to collect information and evidence which can be ascertained inde¬
pendent on any political position. This is ray opinion, is an impossible
task because every sort of theory, idea, or ideational production ob¬
jectively supports or opposes some type of political position or value
judgement, social system or political persuation, despite an author's
original Intention or committment to "value-free scholarship." Conse¬
quently, in this study the intellectual dishonesty or "value-free"
political science is not taken seriously. What is taken seriously,
is of course the fact that a theoretical position must have the necessary
factors to the extend that it can be anchored in the reality it purports
to elucidate. Otherwise it simply becomes a redudant perpsective that
historical facts are forced to fit.
PART I
IMPERIALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER
CHAPTER I
THE EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE OF THE POST WAR INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORDER
International economic order is often used to include the legal and
political orders as well as the specifically economic arrangements gov-
1
erning international politico-economic relations. The legal and polit¬
ical superstructure, as well as the economic arrangements on which post¬
war international politico-economic order operates were founded and
structured at the end of the Second World War by the dominant capital¬
ist power - USA.
The factors which facilitate the development of unequal politico-
economic power relations and those that structure the postwar internation¬
al economic order penetrate the history and relationship of the present
underdeveloped (UDCS) and the developed capitalist countries (DCCS).
Throughout the UDCS, centuries of colonial rule and (imperialist) subju¬
gation have led to their incorporation within a world capitalist system,
i
D. Goulet, World Interdependence; Verbal Smokescreen or New Ethics,
(Washington DCrODC 1976) p. 28.
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and subsequently to a process of soclo-econonjic reorganization that sub¬
jected the indigenous population to the needs and objectives of imper-
2
alism. In the words of Andre Gunder Frank:
(it) is, in the process of the capitalist development and
economic development of the capitalist metropolis in
Europe and North America - the physiology of Africa, Asia
and Latin America has been totally and uniformly changed
into what is today, the structure of underdevelopment
which was...created by and still is consolidated by
the development and structure of the world capitalist
system.
Prior to the emergence of American imperialism, the British industri¬
al revolution, which culminated in the expansion of European imperialism
in the 18th and 19th centuries had spread to western European, Japan and
the USA. By so doing, these countries were able to use their rapidly grow¬
ing economic and military power to carve up the rest of the world and to
assign to the UDCS what would bcome their characteristic role in the
postwar international economic order. The role was to provide raw mate¬
rials products and cheap labor for factories of the industrial center coun¬
tries on the one hand, and on the other to import and consume the finish¬
ed products from the factories of the industrial center countries.
After the second world war, the global contradiction of the capital¬
ist system that produced the war crisis gave way to the development of
four dialectically related forces: firstly, the end of the war which
brought the collapse of european imperialism under the leadership of
Britain; secondly, emergence of the U.S. as the dominant capitalist power;
thirdly, the development of nationalism and liberation movements which led
2
N. Girvan, "Economic Nationalism" Daedalus (Fall 1975) pp. 145-158.
3
A. G. Frank in R. Harris, The Political Economy of Africa, (Mass,
Schenkman, 1975) p. 7.
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to the process of political decoloniazation in Africa and Asia (as political
decolonization in Latin America has been set in motion as far back as in
the 19th century); finally, the Increased consolidation of socialism on
world scale under the leadership of the relatively weak USSR.
All of the above factors, especially the emergence of USA as a domin¬
ant power and the ineffectiveness of political decolonization to undo the
4
"feudal interaction structure of imperialism" gave the U.S. a monopoly of
power to reconstitute the postwar international economic order at the dis¬
advantage of the UDCS.
The establishment of the postwar economic order with its four func¬
tional areas: trade, aid, monetary system and Investment policies (and the
development of global corporations) brought about a foirmulated measure of
"international developmentalism." That is, measures formulated within the
four functional areas of the postwar economic order under two different
politico-Ideological assumptions. The first assumption was that the re¬
covery of Western Europe which was devastated as a result of the war could
be accelerated under a special "Marshal Aid" plan. The second assumption
was that underdevelopment of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin Ameri¬
ca emerging from colonialism had resulted from the backwardness of the
socio-economic institutions concerned. Therefore development could be
initiated by supplying UDCS with scarce resources and institutional moderni¬
zation. Policies and measures were adopted within the structure of the post
war international economic arrangements to promote the flow of capital to
various nations in the form of economic aid and private movement. This
4
N. Girvan, "Economic Nationalism" Daedalus (Fall, 1975) p. 81-117.
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flow of capital for the reconstruction of Western Europe (and afterwards
to aid development of underdeveloped countries) were structured within
the framework of the three major institutions of the international eco¬
nomic system: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank), and the Gener¬
al Agreements on Trades and tariff.
These three postwar institutions were established with two primary
5
functions: to finance the reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan.
Secondly, to correct the prewar trade war that resulted from "Germany's
aggressive use to exchange restrictions and bilateral trading agreements"
and to eliminate Britain's domination of international trade by creating
6
a more liberal multilateral international system of trade and payments.
Only afterwards did the question of development of the underdeveloped
countries come into the functions of those Institutions.
The loans made by the World Bank which is one of the major components
of the international economic system in its early years of operation re¬
flect the purpose for which the institutions were established. Out of the
total loans of $1,382 million made by the bank between 1945 and 1952 a
total of $1,128 million went to the reconstruction and development of
5
E. S. Mason and R. E. Asher, The World Bank Since Bretton Woods,
(Washington, D.G.: Brooking Institutions, 1973) p. 26.
6
C. Payer, The Dept Trap (N.Y.: Monthly Review, 1974) p. 22-23.
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Table 1
World Bank as of June 30, 1952, by











































Australia Europe Hemis. Total
- 497 - 497
100 202 329 885
27 34 253 391
14 1 12 108
- 12 - 12
- 7 - 7
6 - 20 31
- 13 3 21
20 33 35 179
- - 24 25
29 2 12 43
10 13 1 55
5 1 2 20
4 1 5
- 5 - 5
44 25 16 128
6 53 59
3 8 - 11
9 61 - 70
- 9 1 12
— 40 80
- Ai 92
100 699 329 1,382
^o France, Netherlands, Denmark, and Luxembourg
“For machinery, equipment, and construction materials
^For locomtives, rolling stock, rails and shop supplies.
gFor vessels and marine equipment
^For planes and spare parts^For building machinery and equipment.
%or docks, loading and dredging machinery, and harbor craft.
“For telephone and telegraph equipment, and mate
cont'd on page 26
26
^For general farm machinery, and equipment,
^For construction equipment and materials
*Tor machinery equipment and construction materials
^For construction materials
™For machinery and vehicles
Source; Reproduced from E.S. Manson and R.E. Asher, The World Bank Since
Bretton Woods, (Washington D.C.: Brooking Institute 1973)
pp. 178-179.
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Europe. Only $254 million went to Africa, Asia and Middle East countries.
Table 1 on page 25 shows the detail breakdown of the loans by purpose and
7
area.
The establishment of those three institutions started with the
Bretton Woods negotiation. The exercise as explained was aimed at creat¬
ing a non-discriminating international and multilateral systems of trade
and payments and also to prevent the return of prewar exchange restric¬
tions and the bilateral trading system which were regarded as the major
course of the Great Depression and subsequently of the war.
The three institutions were established to carry out different func¬
tions. The IMF was established as a means of improving the system of
trade payments and currency exchange. It was designed to function as an
international credit agency by preventing the balance of payments fluc¬
tuations through a direct short-term lending loans to a needing country.
By so doing the IMF would provide temporary relief to countries in pay¬
ment crises theieby preventing countries in payments crises from curtail
ing imports due to shortage of liquidity, and also "to prevent them from
8
imposing restrictions on trade in order to deal with payment crises."
The fund operates by assigning each member country a quota for contribution.
If one member then has a serious balance of payment crises, it can draw
from the fund in exchange for its own currency, paying back foreign cred-
7
E.S. Mason and R. E. Asher, The World Bank Since Bretton Woods,
(Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institutions, 1973) p. 178.
8
S. Weissman, The Trojan Horse, (California: Ramparts Press, 1974)
p. 13.
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itors with what it has thus drawn out from the fund. The country is requ¬
ired to re-purchase its own currency, however within three to five years.
This means, in effect, that any country borrowing from the fund must meet
its guidelines on what policies to pursue in order to acquire the reserves
needed to re-purchase its currency from the fund.
The fund is structured in such a way that voting rights accord with
financial power, as they are based proportionately on the quotas. The
U.S. and the countries of the Common Market have veto power over lending
policies for two reasons: firstly, they contribute the largest quotas and
secondly, most of the underdeveloped countries who are present members of
the fund were colonies in the AOs when the fund was established. As a
result the fund has been dominated by the U.S. and the Common Market.
The advanced capitalist nations comprise "only one quarter of the fund
memberships but hold three quarters of its quotas and two-thirds of the
total votes. Because of the resources the fund controls and its monopoly
of power to interfere in the internal affairs of borrowing nations" Payer
has described it as "the most powerful supranational government in the
world today... equivalent to the U.S. military establishment with its client
9
armies...as the key institution of imperialism in the world today."
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was esta¬
blished along with the fund in 1944. The principal function of the Bank
was intended to be a guarantor of loans either directly to governments or
with governments as a guarantor. The initial function of the Bank was
financing the reconstruction of Europe, and only afterwards when the bank
9
C. Payer, The Dept Trap, (New York: Monthly Review, 1974) p. IX.
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groups: The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the International
Development Association (IDA) and the International Centre for Settle¬
ment of Investment Disputes (ICSID), were created as a specialized
agency of the UN did the Bank group become "engine of development'.' in
10
UDCS.
The Bank is structured similarly to the fund. Voting rights ac¬
cord with financial power and are also based proportionately on the
quotas. The functions of the Bank and that of fund are complementary.
While the fund concerns itself with short-term debt and the provision
of liquidity to alleviate temporary payments crises (and the financing
required for stabilization programs), the Bank serves as a creditor and
capital supplier for longer projects which supposedly contribute to
11
development. The operation of the Bank is similar to the fund. When
a member country applies for a loan the Bank retain four fifths of the
subscribed capital as a guarantee fund against losses. The Bank makes
the loan only if the subscriber accepts the policies and guidelines of
IMF and the Bank Group. As the article IV of articles of agreement of
the Bank pointed out:
'Payment of interest and principal must be fully guarant-
ed by the borrowing government; the borrower must be
unable to secure funds from other sources on a reasonable
terms; a careful study must be made by a competent com¬
mittee of the merits of the project or programs'... ^
10
E. S. Manson and R.E. Asher, The World Bank Since Bretton Woods,
(Washington, D.G.: Brooking Institution, 1973) p. 28.
11
C. Payer, The Dept Trap, (New York: Monthly Review, 1974) p. 13-14.
12
E.S. Manson and R.E. Asher, The World Bank Since Bretton Woods,
(Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institution, 1973) p. 19.
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The General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs was produced in Geneva at
the same period the Bretton Woods Negotiations were started in New Hamp¬
shire. It was produced in place of the originally intended International
Trade Organization (ITO) as a result of sharp disagreement between the
French, the British and the U.S. While the French had advocated "a measure
of discriminatory action" and "interventionist policy" of international
trade, the U.S. insisted on a non-discriminatory and free market policies
of international trade. The British under pressure from the "open door"
policy of the U.S. government supported the U.S. non-discriminatory trade
policy provided the policy would not challenge Britain's domination of
13
Ottawa. The U.S. prevailed over the French and the GATT was involved.
Insplte of the differences between the French and the U.S. on how to struc¬
ture the international economic system. Corbet and Jackson pointed out
that:
The main objective of GATT and its main practical effect,
have been to govern the conduct of the major trading
countries in (a)their trade with each other (b)in their
competition with each other in the third world countries
and (c)in the way in which third world countries could
behave towards their major trading partners in relation
to that competition. ^
The foregoing discussion about the evolution and structure of the
postwar economic order partly helps to explain the following points; it shows
that the postwar economic order was a product of capitalism at a specific
13
The U.S. was also the first who sought and secured a waiver to
impose tariffs to protect domestic agricultural products. See H. Corbet
and R. Jackson, In Search of a New International Economic Order, (New




stage. The same colonialism was a stage of capitalist expansion. But un¬
like the Europeans imperialism and its economic arrangements, the postwar
15
economic order developed as an economic instance of "modern imperialism,"
whose principal function, and its main practical effect, have been to re¬
structure the international economic arrangements to the benefits of U.S.
capitalism.
Secondly, it shows that the postwar economic arrangements were esta¬
blished to promote development in the center and to guide the conduct of
international interaction among the countries of the center. The majority
of the underdeveloped nations who became functioning members of the post¬
war order were colonies and semi-colonies prior to the war. As a result,
their role in the international economic arrangements was seen as a
supplier of raw materials to the new industry of the center and an import¬
er of Industrial finished products.
When the majority of the colonies and semi-colonies became independent
in the 60s, the three components of the international economic arrangements
became specialized agencies of the UN and the Bank Group was created. But
the creation of the Bank Group, especially the International Financial
Corporation (IFC) was intended to promote the growth of U.S. multinational
corporations and investments in the former colonies. As Manson and Asher
pointed out:
The Bank Group (IFC and IDA) were created to respond to
development requirements - that were beyond the scope
of the World Bank charter and structure...The basic
purpose is to facilitate economic development by invest-
15
For detail discussion about the features of this late 19th century
and 20th century imperialism, see Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism
(1969) and Imperialism: From Colonial Age to the Present (1977) .
Table 2
In millions of U.S
IBRD Loans, IDA Credits, and IFC Investments by Purpose and Area
dollar equivalents
Net as of June 30, 1971
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Tourism
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19,953.1 16,068 2,342.4 4,987.6
5,284.0 5,010.6 600.4 1,075.3
5,876.9 4,958.3 977.2 1,842.2
575.2 348.6 37.1 113.1
2,370.8 1,497.4 203.9 565.7
3,017.4 2,413.2 334.4 1,185.8
1,318.4 637.7 120.0 103.8
424.4 212.7 40.3 48.8
9.8 5.0 - -
328.7 277.7 28.3 44.0
30.0 10.0 - -







576.3 2,963.5 5,007.8 200.0
171.4 700.6 2,462.9 -
89.3 727.7 1,322.0 -
7.0 40.3 151.1 -
- 199.5 528.3 -
- 625.7 267.3 -
308.5 100.0 5.4 _
- 39.3 84.3 -
- - 5.0 -
- 23.7 181.7 -
- 10.0 - -












Agriculture, Forestry & fishing 850.2
Industry 104.0
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Postwar reconstruct












666.0 2,374.9 11.0 111.8 176.7
22.3 187.9 - 25.7 37.5
300.7 536.0 4.5 - 77.3
0.8 225.8 -
158.7 586.7 6.5 51.4 46.9
5.0 64.3 - 34.7 -
680.0 _
150.0 49.7 - - 12.0
4.8 - - - -
18.1 29.9 - - 3.0
- - - - -
- - - - -
5.6 14.6 - - -










Grand total 544.1 83.9 171.1 1.0 70.8 217.3
Electric power - - - - - -
Transportation - - - - - -
Transpor tation - - - - - -
Telecommunications - - - - - -
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 23.2 14.5 - - - 8.7
Industry 500.2 55.8 170.4 1.0 70.8 202.2
General development and industri¬
al imports 0.7 0.7
Education - - - - - -
Population - - - - - -
Water supply and sewerage - - - - -
Tourism 20.0 13.6 - - - 6.4
Postwar reconstruction - - - - - -
Project preparation and
technical assistance
Financing loan (IFC - - - - - -
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ing - without requiring government guarantee of the
investment - in productive private enterprises in its
less developed member countries, in associations with
private investors who can provide competents manage¬
ment.
The International Financial Corporation was created in 1956. In addi¬
tion to the requirements in the above quote, the IFC was responsible for
the supervision of all industrial projects that are financed by the Bank.
The International Development Association (IDA) was created in 1960. It
was intended as a soft loan fund administered by IBRD. The membership in
the two organizations are open to countries who are already members of the
Bank. Despite the fact that IFC was created as a separate organization,
independent of the Bank, voting rights, like that of the Bank and IDA ac-
17
cord with financial power and are based proportionately on the quotas.
However the creation of the Bank Group did not alter in any signifi¬
cant way the outflow of capital from the center to the periphery. If we
compare the 1945 outflow of capital in Table I with the 1971 outflow of
capital in Table 2. on page 32, we find that out of the total Bank Group
loans of $16,068.6 million $8,547.6 went to Europe and Oceania, $7,321
million to Africa, Asia and the Middle East. The remaining $200 million
went into IFC as financing loans. In the same period $255 million of a
total $544.1 million of IFC Investments and $3,040.9 million of a total
$3,340.4 million of IDA loans went to Africa, Asia and the Middle East.
16
E.S. Manson _et^. The World Bank Since Bretton Woods, Washington,




Of this total credit loans and investment capital for Africa, Asia and the
Middle East, more than 60 percent was spent on general development and
18
industrial imports.
The final point our analysis helps to explain is that the legal and
politico-economic superstructure of the postwar order was designed by
western imperialism to promote development among the industrialized capit¬
alist countries. The nations of the underdeveloped world who became
functioning members of this postwar order, without a previous attempt to
internally transform their society, and restructure their relationship
with the internalonal order only accentuates the dichotomy of the develop¬
ment of underdevelopment. A dichotomy tjiich has been established and set
in motion prior to WWII. We shall return to this in detail in chapter five.
The effects of this postwar order on the economies of UDCS will be
dealth with in the next chapter. However, it is suffice to say that the
postwar economic arrangements allowed the ex-colonies of the third world
to diversify their trade by preventing colonial powers from imposing bi¬
lateral trade arrangements on the ex-colonies, in order to secure favorable
bilateral trade payment. But it also "allowed the U.S. to pursue policies
of high altruism" which facilitated the postwar economic boom and the re-
19
storation of the economies of western Europe after the war.
It was the activities of the postwar order which increased the wealth




H. Corbet, etal In Search of New Internalonal Economic Order,
(New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1976) p. 234.
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U.S. These countries enjoy about 89 percent of the worlds Gross National
Product, while two third of the world population - the vast majority of
the people of Africa, Asia and Latin America - enjoy less than 11 percent
of the world's Gross National Product, i.e., a consimption of less than
20
one tenth of the world's resources. (see Table 17 Statistical Appendix)
The people of the periphery continue to live in persistent poverty which
is pervasive and staggering. Yet, the land in which they live and on
which they labor are rich. They have produced unmeasurable wealth for
their own ruling elites and have produced enough wealth to sustain imperi¬
alist capitalism through unequal international politico-economic networks.
As shall be seen later, their underdevelopment has resulted from the fact
that the surplus they generate is not being utilized for their development
but rather for the extravaganzes and waste of the metropoles.
20
M. Ul. Haq, The Poverty Curtain, (New York; Columbia Univ. Press, 1976)
p. 125.
CHAPTER II
THE CONGRUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT
IN THE THIRD WORLD
In the previous section, we made a brief analysis of the development
of the post war economic order. In this section we will focus on the
relationship between private foreign investment and underdevelopment because
while it is clear that all four of our functional areas, i.e. trade, aid,
monetary policies, and investment practices, complement one another, private
foreign investment appears as the basic international factor that conditions
the situation of underdevelopment. This important role is derived from
the fact that the operations of private foreign investment*- touches every
concern of international and national policies, foreign aid, trade flows
and trade policy, the functioning of the monetary system, underdeveloped
contries* development, the transfer and location of high production tech¬
nology, raw materials, supply and demand, and most importantly, the capacity
of national governments to meet goals of their constituents, and fundamental
politico-ideological issues such as the appropriate path to development,
the role of foreign capital and "dependencia." Furthermore, private
foreign investment has Important effects on employments, jobs, price levels,




wages, growth and national self-preservation in all countries it touches.
Thus, the study of foreign private investment precludes some generaliza¬
tions about all of the above factors. Hence, we can appropriately
rephrase Cheryl Payer that private foreign investment is the "Keystone of
a total system" of imperialism.
In order to understand this phenomenon of private foreign Investment
and how it relates to the problematics of underdevelopment, it is necessary
to elucidate the evolution of foreign investment. Prior to WWI, private
foreign investment in UDCS were mostly in primary products and extractive
sectors. This type of Investment often referred to as "portfolio invest¬
ment" was designed to provide finance for the expansion of infrastructure
that would increase the colonies' capacity to produce and export food and
raw materials to the metropolis. Although the USA did not emerge as a
strong imperialist power until after WWII, its emerging dominant role in
the midst of WWII forced the colonial powers to accept the "open door"
policy of the "New Deal" government. Open door policy, according to
Magdoff, took two forms: (1) the opening up of the semi-colonized and
non-colonized territories of the world for free trade and Investment, and
(2) exerting pressure on the prewar colonial powers to open up their
"Colonial empires for equal rights to trade and investment for USA
business." As a matter of fact, the three institutions of the post war
economic arrangements established to rescue western Europe economies were
predicated on the removal in their empires of nondiscriminatory practices
against U.S. business.
2
C. F. Bergsten, Toward A New International Economic Order (Toronto:
Lexington Books, 1974), pp. 17-18.
O
•^H. Magdoff, Age of Imperialism (New York: Monthly Review, 1959) ,
p. 126.
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The second aspect of the open door policy ranks higher on the order
of priorities of U.S. policy. It gave stimulus to the rapid growth of
MNCS through devices such as "investment guaranty treaty" and "the invest¬
ment guaranty program." The latter provides insurance for U.S. businesses
and the emerging corporations investing abroad against losses either due
to nationalization and/or inability to convert income to U.S. dollars,
while the former is used as a criterion for making the insurance program
available and to create the protective environment for private investments
A
from USA. The result of this open door policy designed to pressure
ex-colonies to open their doors for the free trade and investment was
rapid incorporation of UDCS into the post war multilateral system of trade
payment and increased specialization of UDCS economy in the production of
primary products. It is not surprising that these two factors combined
with the deteriorating terms of trade and the stagnant markets of UDCS
due to the depression and the decline of the war exacerbated their develop¬
ment problems and their subsequent need for development capital to indus¬
trialize their newly independent nations facilitated the growth of MNCS
and subsequently the shift from portfolio investment to direct private
investment.
The differences between portfolio investment loans and similar form
of capital export practiced by European imperialism before the World Wars
and the American emphasis on direct investment is that the underlying
motive of the latter is financial, i.e., to obtain a higher return on
investment capital; managerial control continues to rest with the borrower
and the liabilities incurred by debt-borrowing can be liquidated through
^Ibid., p. 128.
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repayment. On the other hand, the motivation for direct investment and
for the possession of foreign subsidiaries or branches is primarily the
acquisition of markets and managerial control.^ According to Magdoff,
private foreign investment is geared to control: "control of raw materials
and control of markets—both activities inherent to monopoly of business
in the normal pursuit of larger profits and for the protection of monopoly
(capitalism's) positions."
The consequence of the post war struggle for control of raw materials
and markets to ensure the smooth reproduction of the unequal international
division of labor created an environment favourable to the expansion of
MNCS in the underdeveloped countries. The expansion of U.S. corporations
which began as early as 1890's was accelerated during this period. Thus
by 1970 the U.S. private foreign investment of about $7 billion in 1946
was raised to $80 billion.^
The development of private foreign investment on a large scale and
the corresponding rise in the expansion of MNCS pointed out that analysis
of foreign investment can not be divorced from MNCS. They are the keystone
of (modern) imperialist system. To quote from Barnet and Muller:
. . .The country which corporate presidents eye as a
cheap source of, say, ]lUngsten, needed to make a
particular product, the Pentagon regards for that very
reason as a vital link in the national security system
and the commerce department sees as indispensable to
the U.S. economy. When corporate executives view
particular countries as sources of profits and finance
capital, politicians see them as contributors to the
U.S. balance of payment.®
^R. Gilpin, "The Political Economy of MNCS," APSR vol. LXX (March
1976), pp. 185-191.
Magdoff, op. cit., p. 115.
^Gilpin, op. cit., p. 184.
O
R. J. Baimet and R. E. Muller, Global Reach (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1974), p. 125.
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The symbiotic relationship between foreign investment, or in other
words between corporations and the state resulted in the expansion of
capital into underdeveloped countries on scale needed by MNCS to maintain
institutional setting favorable to foreign investment and the functioning
of the post war international capitalist system. These activities of
maintaining a favorable "investment climate" in underdeveloped countries
have been pursued through direct military intervention or indirectly
through support for neo-colonial regimes. Here is not the place to
catalogue the suffering and misery of the people of the underdeveloped
countries, which have resulted from the maintenance of neo-colonialism
by war, subversion, etc.
The rationale of capitalism is that neo-colonialism is an unavoidable
aspect of transition from underdevelopment. Development, according to this
ideology, can only be brought about by the diffusion of capital. In other
words, underdevelopment is seen as a manifestation of technology, lack of
savings, lack of entrepreneurial talent, lack of government revenue, lack
of technical know-how, lack of intrastructure and lack of employment.
It was also seen as cause of the strains on export potentialities whether
this be in primary products or in cheap manufactures and the concomitant
balance of payment problems.^® Since the above set of interrelated problems
are not seen as a direct result of capitalist expansion and the absorption
of the UDCS into asymmetric international economic relations, foreign
investment, as argued by Ady, is the only mechanism available which can
^P. Sweezy, "Corporations, the State and Imperialism," Monthly Review,
Vol. 30, No. 6 (November 1978), p. 6-8.
Ady, Private Foreign Investment and the Developing World (New York
Fraege Publishers, 1972), p. 26.
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compensate the above shortages, and hence can present a real transfer
needed for full-fledged capitalist development.
Foreign investment provides financial Incentive
and Industrial experience for reallocation of local
resources into its creation. It also extends employ¬
ment and contributes to government revenue. It
brings in capital, compensates for a lack^jf saving
...and generates higher domestic savings.
Ady emphasized that foreign Investment makes a substantial contribution to
the economies of the host country by generating domestic entrepreneurial
talent, and by setting both an example and a climate of competition and
expansion of overhead capital.
Ady is not alone in his view about the role of foreign investment,
G. L. Reuber and his associations in their book. Private Foreign Investment
in Development stand firmly in a pro foreign investment school. They argue
that foreign investment is a neutral provider of capital, expertise and
technology, which are superior in all cases to local alternatives. Reuber
rejected all argument about the negative impact of foreign investment and
argues that foreign investment has negative Impact only when the host
12
government has adopted incorrect policies.
The bankruptcy of this approach and of conventional economics as a
whole is that the argument about foreign investment always proceeds by
presenting a competitive model between tariffs, taxes and governmental
control. The social benefit—cost analysis of foreign investment is not
considered. Market prices are used to measure social values and distortions
are mostly attributed to incorrect government policies or lack of technical
^^Ibid., p. 25.
12
G. L. Reuber, e^.^- > Private Foreign Investment in Development
(Oxford: Claredon Press, 1973).
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know how. Foreign investors which extract economic surplus from the
periphery and are the prime cause of market distortions are treated as
13
neutral providers of capital and expertise.
Contrary to this conventional view about foreign investments and
economic development is the obvious fact that the flow of capital that
actually does occur in the asymmetric international economic relations
is from the poor underdeveloped nations to the rich developed ones.^^
In order to understand how this is done, we shall now turn and examine
one after another the major myths and realities of the contribution of
foreign investment to economic development.
Private Foreign Investment and Transfer of Technology
15The popular scenario of the pro-investment school is that foreign
investment allowed the transfer of advanced technology from advanced
capitalist countries to underdeveloped nations and that the technology
transfered makes useful contribution to financial inflows and development
of UDCS. The issue as we shall discuss here is not whether transfer of
technology is desirable or not. Our main concern is about the appropriate¬
ness of the technology transferred and the social structure that the
technology is transferred to.
Lall, "Less-Developed Countries and Private Foreign Direct
Investment," World Development, Vol. 2, Nos. 4 and 5 (April - May 1974),
pp. 43-45.
^^Cockroft, et.al., Dependence and Underdevelopment (New York:
Doubleday Press, 1972), p. XII.
^^Among other proponents of this view is Jagdish Bhagwati (1974),
Charles P. Kindleberger (1969, 1970), and C. F. Bergsteln (1974, 1975,
1976).
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As regards the appropriateness of technology transferred from the
16
center to the periphery, studies of its impact on employment, income
distribution and cost have shown that technology transfer makes little or
no useful contribution to financial Inflows to UDCS. It is rather one of
the major underlying cause of unemployment crises in UDCS. The simple
reason is that the very nature of technology transferred has been designed
for the resource conditions of advanced capitalism, where there is a relative
abundance of capital and relative scarcity of labor. This, in effect,
means that the technology transferred to the periphery is incapable of
absorbing labor, because it has been designed to be labor saving and
capital intensive. Thus, by substituting capital for labor it continously
perpetuates unemployment and economic impoverishment.
Another dimension of transfer of technology is that it perpetuates
unequal income distribution in UDCS. In most underdeveloped nations the
institutional arrangements is such that the owner of capital resources
appropriate directly income generated from those resources. Since techno¬
logy transferred is privately owned by MNCS and few national bourgeoisie
in joint ventures, it means that large proportion of income generated
from those capital resources rather than labor resources is appropriated
17
by MNCS and a very small number of the indigenous populations. This
issue of unequal income distribution is one of the prime causes of economic
impoverishment in UDCS. In a study of income distribution in Mexico in the
^^Among some of the studies are S. Amin, Imperialism (1977), Part III,
Wilber, The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment (1973),
Part III, and Magdoff, Imperialism (1977), Ch. 9.
^^C. K. Wilber, The Political Ecnomy of Development and Underdevelop¬
ment (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 132-33.
46
early 50*s, Muller Indicates that the ratio of individual income of the
richest 20 percent to individual Income of the poorest was 10:1. By 1960
18
this figure had risen to 19:1. (See Table 18 in Statistical Appendix.)
Another dimension of technology transfer is that it promotes outflow
of capital from UDCS to advanced capitalist countries through overpricing
of technology transferred, repatriations, royalties, etc. The reason for
overvaluation of technology is "to produce politically attractive financial
statements that will make investment look bigger and one's profit look
„19smaller. Since the higher the fixed investments the greater will be
profits that can be transferred out of UDCS.
Other aspects of technology transfer is the "brain drain" embedded
in the structural process of technology dependency. This aspect of
technology transfer appears as the most negative impact of foreign invest¬
ment on underdeveloped nations. Because it allowed the growth and accummula-
tlon of useful knowledge and the transformation of knowledge into final
output via technical and scientific innovation to rest firmly in advanced
20
capitalist nations. This, more than resource endowment, as3nmnetrlc
international trade or the monopoly of modern technology by imperialist
capitalism accounts for the differences in the rates of growth of income
per head between developed capitalist countries and UDCS. The argument
here is not that technology dependency is sufficient enough to explain the
nature of international economy, rather our contention is that a strong
^^Ibid., pp. 132-34.
^^Ibid., p. 163.
Griffin, "The International Transmission of Inequality," World
Development, Vol. 2, No. 3 (March 1974), pp. 3-15.
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correlation exists between economic growth and technological innovation.
In UDCS, policies of economic growth are pursued by encouraging factors
that will increase accumulation of capital and expand the labor force
(i.e., in the productivity of factors of production), while in developed
capitalist nations the policy of economic growth is pursued by an Increase
in factor productivity, i.e., in a continuous technical and scientific
21
innovation.
Thus, the issue of transfer of technology is more than whether it
is overpriced or not. The main issue is that the technology of advanced
capitalist countries perpetuates dependency on imperialism by reinforcing
unequal International division of labor. To quote Samir Amin:
The technologies of the imperialist centers would not
be able to solve the problems of underdevelopment
at the perphery. This technology is very costly,
not only because of its capital-intensive nature, but
because of wasteful consumption patterns it brings
with it, the excessive exploitations of natural
resources that it implies, etc. In other words, this
technology presupposes imperialism, i.e., the excessive
exploitation of labor in the periphery. Thus it can
only reproduce the relations of unequal development
within the imperialist system.
Now, let us turn to our second question about technology and social
structure. The technology of the imperialist centers is not independent
of the social structure that produces it. It is embedded in the capitalist
relations of the West. When this technology is transferred to a dependency
capitalism of the periphery, it will support the class relations of
production and "extend its scope by integrating the periphery more firmly
^^Ibld., p. 4.
22
S. Amin, Imperialism and Unequal Development (New York: Monthly
Review, 1977), p. 173.
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into the imperialist system." But if the technology is transferred
to a socialist social structure, one is which the capitalist relations of
production have been dismantled and "the forces of socialism dominate,"
the borrowed technology can be used to strengthen social development rather
than to dominate and exploit. This, in effect means that while we have
rejected the conventional theory that foreign investment is the transmitter
of technology needed for economic development in the periphery, we do see
beyond the ultra leftist argument that a socialist structure can adapt
modern technology to fit policy of socialist development.
Private Foreign Investment, Export of Capital and Balance of Payment
Similar to the above argument about transfer of technology is the
notion that foreign investment generates finance capital that alleviates
the general dearth of underdeveloped countries’ domestic saving, foreign
exchange problems and balance of payments problems. The study of MNCS has
shown that out of the total finance capital utilized by MNCS in their
gross investment only 17 percent or less come from foreign savings. The
rest comes from local savings by way of local markets and reinvested
24
earnings. This process of decapitalization of periphery through foreign
investment is essentially a characteristic of modem imperialist capitalism.
This is where the controversy lies among radicals as to whether Lenin’s
definition of imperialism as "export of capital" can still be applied to
20th century imperialism. But if we accept (this has been demonstrated by
Magdoff, Sweezy, Amin and Baran) that capital is not just money but social
relations, it means that foreign investment is capital movement which does
^^Ibid.. p. 172.
K. Wilber, op. cit., p. 139.
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not involve the movement of fund from the center to the periphery. Rather
it involves the movement of technology and management,both geared to
control and to monopolize business. The table below shows the exact
movement of fund by foreign investors.
Table 3
Percentage of U.S. MNC Gross Investments in Latin America
Financed from Local versus Foreign Savings
Origin of Finance Capital
1957-1965
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Reinvested
Earnings and Local, Host Total Local
Area and Sector USA Depreciation Country (B + C)
Latin America, total 17 59 24 83
Mining and Smelting 8 78 14 92
Petroleum 13 79 8 87
Manufacturing 22 38 40 78
Source; Reproduced from Wilber, p. 43.
As the table indicated, only 17 percent of total finance capital came from
foreign saving. The remaining 78 percent came from local saving and of the
total finance capital used by subsidiaries of MNCS 38 percent comes from
reinvested earnings and 40 percent from local capital markets. It was
also pointed out in the same study of Latin America that between 1960-1968
the U.S. based MNCS reported taking out 79 percent of their net profits out
of Latin America while the reinvested earnings was used in buying out local
firms whose profits would otherwise be retained domestically and thus
26
contribute to local consumption/or savings.
25
H. Magdoff, Imperialism; From the Colonial Age to the Present (New
York Monthly Review, 1978), Ch. 9. Also see C. P. Kindleberge, American
Business Abroad (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1969), p. 9.
^^C. K. Wilber, op. cit., p. 139.
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As regards the contribution of foreign investment to balance of
payments problems, the study of "triangular trade" of foreign investors
has proved this argument to be more myth than reality. The process of
triangular trade involves the shipment of goods from the parent company
of MNCS to the subsidiary of the same company, say in Nigeria. The imported
goods are then re-exported from Nigeria to another third world country,
say Kenya. By so doing the MNCS evolved overpriced the goods in Nigeria
and Kenya in order to avoid tax payment on the true profits in both
countries. This application of overpricing and underpricing diverts foreign
exchange and tax revenue from third world countries. The table on page 51
gives an empirical evidence on import overpricing in Colombia.
As the studies indicated, the government of Colombia in 1968 lost
about $200 million in balance of payments and $100 million in governmental
27
tax revenues to one industry due to overpricing.
Another method used by foreign Investors in decapitalizing third
world economies is through what is called "annual rate of return on invest¬
ment," that is, returns based on the net worth of investment as declared by
the investors. The return on Investment by twenty-five third world countries
28
to U.S. in 1964 was $4,800 million (see Table 19 in Statistical Appendix),
in 1977 had risen to $7,756 million. As the table on page 52 indicates the
rate of return on Investment from third world to the U.S. double the rate of
return on investment from the developed capitalist countries to the U.S.
^^Ibid., pp. 143-46.
28
P. Jalee, The Third World in World Economy (New York: Monthly Review,
1969), p. 115.
Table 4
Overpricing of Imported Intermediate Parts by Foreign Ownership Structure: Colombia 1968
Ownership
Structure Pharmaceutical Industry Rubber Industry Chemical Industry Electronics Industry
a bc*abcabc ab c
Foreign
Owned 50% 25% 155% 33% 60% 40% 30% 12% 25.5% 40% 90% 16%-60%
Joint





approximate percentage of sales of sample firms relative to total sales of firms with a similar
ownership structure
total volume of Imports samples and evaluated as a percentage of the firm's total imports
weighted average of overpricing of evaluated imports
not available
*Indivldual firm data are as follows (in percent): #1: 253.6; #2: 133.7; #3: 132.8; #4: 306.2;
#5: 483; #6: 39.5; #7: 179.4; #8: 79.1; #9: 58.3; #10: 73.8; #11: 475.4; #12: 374.7; #13:
177.5; #14: 164.8; #15: 60.4; #16: 476.9; #17: 34.4.
Source: Reproduced from Wilber, p. 143.
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Table 5
Income and Rate of Return on U.S. Investment
1976 - 1977
Income (1976) R.R.I. Income (1977) R.R.I.
Developed Countries 11,461 12.0 11,889 11.4
Underdeveloped Countries 7,047 25.5 7,756 24.8
Source: Survey of Current Business (August, 1978), p. 22.
In the same years 1976 and 1977, the
29
total outflow of U.S. capital on
foreign investment to underdeveloped countries were $2,267 million respect¬
ively. While the total of $9,013 million in 1976 and $7,626 million in
301977 outflowed from the U.S. to developed capitalist countries.
The final point we would examine about foreign Investment and capital
outflow is what is being referred to as "joint investment," that is, when
a foreign investor establishes a joint enterprise with a host government or
government agency. The foreign Investor puts up about 30-40 percent of
the capital—usually from local saving. The host government provides the
rest of the capital by obtaining aid from the home government or multi¬
lateral institutions of the investor or MNCS concerned. The host country
also provides appropriate location for firm or technology transferred,
construct roads when necessary to make it accessible to markets, provide
housing and special priviledges for the investors managerial and technical
staff. The risk of nationalization or problems of tariff barriers are
eliminated while the eventuality of lost venture is the government's
responsibility. While the host government continues to bear the burden
29
Total amount here refers to capital outflow from U.S. to both U.S.
unincorporated and incorporated subsidiaries in the third world.
30
Survey of Current Business (August, 1978), p. 25.
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of the expenses involved including servicing the aid provided, foreign
Investors repatriate profits, and reinvested earnings to buy out domestic
firms. The applications of the above process creates balance of pajnnents
problems and scarcity of capital needed for development.
Finally (this is perhaps the most important aspect of foreign invest¬
ment) foreign investment tends to control "marketplace ideology, the values
31that determine how people live." It penetrates the political, religious,
ideological and cultural institutions of society. Foreign investment
transfers the capitalist Ideology of consumption and creates cultural
dependence through the mass media. In sum total, foreign investment is
the keystone of imperialism. A modern method of perpetuating uneven
development through the monopoly of raw materials, markets, technology and
scientific knowledge. Foreign Investment reinforces the specialization of
the periphery as producers of primary products. It makes resources in
underdeveloped countries immobile. This immobility further makes the
reallocation of resources from one sector to another which "experience
32
comparative advantage" and the transformation of the economy impossible.
By so doing it makes the gains of free international trade asymetric.
In a final conclusion from our analyses thus far, foreign investment
seems to be one of the major obstacles to the development of underdeveloped
countries. It drains potential economic surplus, reinforces capitalist
class relations through the transfer of technology. And since the technology
K. Wilber, op. cit., p. 172.
32
K. Griffin, op. cit., pp. 6-9.
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transferred is designed to meet market demands of the 20 percent population
who have the money to spend, it perpetuates unemployment of the majority
and subsequently their economic impoverishment. Foreign investment does
not contribute to capital inflows to third world nations, rather it tends
to decapitalize the economies of the periphery through repartriation of
profits, overvaluation of technology, and imported articles, etc. It also
perpetuates the marginalization of the majority of the population by
obstructing their transition from the condition of deproductivization
in the economy to the sphere of production.
PART II
TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER
CHAPTER III
THIRD WORLD POST WAR DEVELOPMENT DILEMMA: A MOTIVATION
FOR THE DEMAND FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER
In the previous chapters, we have tried to show in a brief discussion
the evolution and structure of the post war international economic order.
One component of the post war order - private foreign investment has been
analyzed in terms of its utility in underdeveloped economies. The inade¬
quacies of the post war institutions - IMF, IBRD, and GATT did not become
apparent until the end of the U.N. first development decade. During this
period, the misery and poverty of the people of Africa, Asia and Latin
America increased. The average national income per capital had decreased
when compared to the prewar growth of 2.8 per annum. The life expectancy
1
of the majority of the people averaged less than fifty, years. The post
war period was marked with increase in poverty, hunger, economic stagna¬
tion, chronic disease, deteriorating terns of trade, political instability,
drought, malnutrition etc., "for the poorest of the poor of underdeveloped
2
nations health care and formal education" are either unknown or unavail-
1
L.B. Pearson, Partners in Development, (New York: Praeger Pub., 1969)
pp. 40-42.
2
C.K. Wilber, The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment,
(New York: Random House, 1973) pp. 324-326.
55
56
able. This is the underdeveloped world.
In the other part of the world the story was different. Average na¬
tional income per capita exceeded $1,000 compared to less than $100 for
the underdeveloped nations. The life expectancy average more than sev¬
enty years. The war on hunger and malnutrition have been conquered. In
some of the societies under discussion health care and formal education
are even considered basic human rights. This is the world of western
Europe, Japan and USA. It is the imperialist world and it is also the
developed world.
The developed and underdeveloped nations live in one world the capit¬
alist world. It is in reality one world system, but divided into two
separate unequal humanities - one developed and embarrasingly rich the
other underdeveloped and embarrasingly poor. The forces that perpetuated
this dichotomy of development of underdevelopment resulted from the accu¬
mulation of historical processes and the transformation of unequal power
relations into an international network of arrangements via international
economic institutions upon which the performance of the world capitalist
system ultimately depends.
In order to understand this historical process of underdevelopment
and how it produces the symptons referred to above, we shall now examine
third world post war development dilemmas. As we have set out to argue
in this chapter, it was the increased symptoms of underdevelopment mani¬
fested in the post war economic dilemmas of the third world that led to
the demand for a NIEO. Although several other non-economic factors con¬
tributed to the process, presently we shall limit our discussion to the
post war economic factors.
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The period following the second world war was marked by the accession
to independence of many countries of Africa and Asia. As these countries
became Independent, they become functioning members of the International
network of economic arrangements. Albeit, majority of them were colonies
and simi-colonies when those institutions were established but they accept¬
ed the liberal law of comparative advantage which says that by means of
free exchange of commodities, the removal of restrictions on the flow of
Investment, and international division of labor and specialization, every
nation will benefit in the long run from international trade because the
world's scarce resources will be efficiently distributed. And the national
Interest will therefore be best served. Within this framework, policies
were formulated to aid the development of third world. This led to the
inauguration of the U.N. first development decade. The assumption behind
the first development decade was that a coordinated international approach
to development promoted by the U.N. in the form of "aggregate development
3
target with summary information about policies and actions" will encour¬
age all countries and organizations to focus interest on Issues of devel¬
opment. Under the 1961 U.N. General Assembly Special Resolution, a 5
4
percent annual growth was set for all underdeveloped countries. The dev¬
eloped countries were charged with an official development assistance of
1 percent of their total GNP. The objective was that an outflow of 1 per¬
cent of GNP in official aid from developed countries to underedeveloped
countries would allow for the accumulation of necessary capital to attain
C. Legum, The First U.N. Development Decade, (New York: Praeger Pub.
1970) p. 3
4
Pearson. Op. Cit. p.28
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5 percent annual growth needed for the "take-off."
By the end of the first development decade the 5 percent annual growth
rate predicted for underdeveloped countries was far from being realized.
The total resource flows of percent of GNP from all developed capitalist
countries had been computed to be 0.89 percent in 1960, 0.74 percent in
5
1967 and 0.77 percent in 1968. For individual capitalist countries the
figures were 0.38 percent for U.S. and 0.42 percent for U.K. (see table 6
below).
TABLE 6




















Source; L.B. Pearson, Partners in Development (New York: Praeger Pub. 1969)
On a factual basis the first development decade was characterized
as compared with the 30s and 40s by the following elements: firstly, the
period was marked by a decline in the growth rate of GNP and the rate of
growth of GNP per capita for all third world nations. Secondly, agricul¬
tural output declined in great proportion to population explosion. Third¬
ly, the expansion of the industrial sector declined when compared to the




the foreign trade of underdeveloped nations when compared to the total
6
growth of expansion of world trade.
The above elements, which were conditioned by the general decline
in the economies of underdeveloped countries in the period 1960-1967
give rise to the following conclusions: Firstly, the reduction in the
expansion of agricultural outputs led to a correlative decrease in in¬
dustrial expansion and to the slow down of the overall economic growth.
The reason is that agriculture occupies the dominant position in the
economies of underdeveloped countries. This sector employed more than
"70 percent of the total active population, provided more than 50 per¬
cent of the total output (excluding services) and accounted for about
7
60 percent of the foreign trade" of most underdeveloped countries.
This, in effect means that an expansion of production in agriculture
would be required to allow growth of the entire economy.
The figure in Table 7 on page fflshows the development of agricul¬
ture in the period from 1960-1967. When compared with the total out¬
put in agriculture before the 60s and with the 2.6 percent growth rate
8
in population, a decline of the agricultural output was noted. This
decline in agricultural output was marked mainly by a strong decrease
in per capita food production. Thus the increase in food production
brought about the increase in food imports by underdeveloped countries.
As Paul Balroch pointed out:
...before the war the underdeveloped countries (Argentina
excluded) had a grain surplus of about 11 million tons, a
6







Development of Agricultral Output in Underdeveloped Countries, 1948-67
Total
Agricultural Output Food Production
Index
(1952- 56=100)
1948-52 to 1953-55^ 87
1953-55 to 1959-6l| 100























^Indexes are based on data referring to the beginning of each period.





deficit began to appear at the end of the war and has been
increasing steadily: 6 million tons of 1950, 16 million
in 1960, and 23 million tons in 1966. Inspite of the fact
that a significant part of the food imports are gifts and
that the prices for food stuffs have fallen, the value of
those Imports rose from $3.5 billion in 1955 to $4.7 billion
in 1960 and $6.4 million in 1966, thus reducing the resources
available for Importing capital equipment.^
Secondly, the decrease in industrial expansion was marked by a strong
growth rate in foreign trade. This is accounted for mainly by an increase
in export of goods produced in the extractive sector of the economies of
underdeveloped countries. This sector is often referred to as "economic
enclave" because it employed less than 10 percent of the total active pro¬
duction but export more than 90 percent of total production, and on the
other side 90 percent or more of the working population are employed in the
agricultural sector with less than 2 percent of their total production be¬
ing exported. Because of this economic distortion underdeveloped countries
account "for only 13 percent of the value of all manufacturing industry
10
output, and in mining industry for 95 percent" in the world in 1966.
The slow rate of growth in the manufacturing sector and the expansion
of the extractive sector increased the role of third world as producer of
primary products and Importer of industrial goods. If we compare figures
in table 8 and 9 on pages 62 and 63 we notice that the slower growth in
agriculture brought about slow growth rate in manufacturing and a subse¬
ll








Development of Manufacturing Industry in Underdeveloped Countries, 1948-67
Overall Manufacturing a
Industry Light Industry Heavy Industry
Annual Annual Annual
Index variation Index variation Index variation
(1958 = 100) (per cent) (1958 = 100) (per cent) (1958 = 100) (per cent)
1948-54^' 54 5.2 62 4.1 43 7.4
1954-60^ 73 8.0 79 6.0 66 10.8
1960-67 116 7.2 112 5.7 122 8.9
1960 116 8.5 112 7.5 122 11.0
1961 126 8.5 119 6.5 135 10.5
1962 133 5.5 124 4.0 146 8.0
1963 144 8.5 132 6.5 159 9.0
1964 158 9.5 142 7.5 180 13.0
1965 172 9.0 152 7.0 197 9.5
1966 183 6.5 161 6.0 213 8.0
1967 189 3.5 165 2.5 221 3.5
^Foodstuffs, beverages, textiles, timber.
^Paper, chemicals, metals, nonmetallic mineral products.
^Indexes are based on data referring to the beginning of each period.




Development of Mining Industry in Underdeveloped Countries, 1948 -67
Overall Mining Industry Fuel Ores
Index Annual Annual Annual
(1958 = 100) variation Index variation Index variation
a
(per cent) (1958 = 100) (per cent) (1958 = 100) (per cent)
1948-54^ 41.3 9.4 39.5 9.9 55.2 6.4
1954-60 70.7 69.5 9.6, 80.2
1960-67^ 121.8 8.2^ 120.2 9.2^ 135.2 5.0’"
1960 121.8 12.0 120.2 11.5 135.2 18.5
1961 129.8 6.5 129.0 7.5 136.3 1.0
1962 140.2 8.0 140.3 9.0 139.8 2.5
1963 155.6 11.0 156.7 11.5 146.7 5.0
1964 173.7 11.5 175.1 11.5 163.0 11.0
1965 188.8, 8.5 189.9 8.5 179.9, 10.5
1966 202.0^ 7.0 208.0^ 9.5 183.0° 2.0
1967 212.0° 5.0 223.0° 7.0 190.0 4.0
^Indexes are based on data erferring to the beginning of each period,
provisional figures; see text.




If we turn to foreiga trade which registered the greatest growth dur¬
ing the first development decade period, we find that the expansion in
trade resulted not from favorable performance of the economy of underdev¬
eloped countries, but rather from the rapid growth experienced by the
economies of developed capitalist countries which accounted for more than
12
70 percentof total trade of underdeveloped countries for this period.
The reason for this was because the greater percent of the total export
of underdeveloped countries for this period was in the extractive indus¬
try which employed a relatively small percentage of the active population.
This means that the high growth experienced in the period 1960-1967 was
due mainly to the export in the petroleum industry. When the export of
non-oil producing countries (see table 20 in statistical appendix) was
excluded from the overall trade of underdeveloped states, a higher deteri-
13
oration in trade was registered.
The above analysis of the major sectors of the economy have shown
that the underdeveloped nations experienced high irregular growth rate in
the first development decade when compared to the 50s. Paul Bairoch
summarized the period in this manner:
...economic growth has slowed down,...the growth of the
GNP per capita between 1960 and the 1967 did not amount
to more than 65 percent of the period from 1950 to 1960.
The 305 percent actually achieved, if reduced to the
level or per capita growth rate...will amount to only
about 1 pejgent, whereas nearly 3 percent had been
predicted.
The first development decade period was not only marked by declined








tries, but by a strong jump in the external financial aid of $6 to $10
billion from 1960 to 1968 and external financial debt which grew from
15
$17 billion in 1960 to $40 billion by 1968.
The above observation about the behavior of the economies of the
post war period do not imply that growth rate in itself is a sufficient
measuring instrument of development because it usually ignores the
problem of structural transformation which must be considered before
passing judgement whether 5 percent, 4 percent or 3 percent growth rate
is positive or ngeative. Our purpose here is not to analyze all the
economic Indicators of the post war period, rather it is to show that
the emergence of the demand for a NIEO represents the culmination of
a series of historical factors which can be traced to the economic
dilemmas of the post war period.
The other economic and political factors which precipitated the de¬
mand for a NIEO include; the shift from the "bipolar nuclear crises" of
the 50s to the multipolar economic crises of the 60s, the economic re¬
covery of western European and Japan, the collapse of the Bretton Wood
System, the collapse of the post war GATT arrangements, the failure of
the U.N. developments decades, the creations of UNCTAD, the increase in
external financial dept of third world nations, the outbreak of the 1973
Middle East War and the subsequent activities of OPEC, and the defeat
of U.S. imperialism in Vietnam.
The shift from the "bipolar nuclear crises" of the cold war years




security system under the nuclear umbrella of the U.S. and the USSR, all
International economic disputes were seen and discussed from the East-
West Cold War scholarship. Secondly, the recovery of Western Europe and
Japan and the economic challenge they posed to U.S, imperialist capital-
16
ism. Thirdly, the collapse of the post war international monetary
arrangements, which culminated in the initial devaluation of U.S. dollar
in 1971, and the subsequent shift from the fixed exchange rate against
the dollar to floating exchange rates. This action by the U.S. led to
a world wide recession which created economic problems for third world
countries and increased their awareness of the impact of international
17
monetary system on national monetary systems. Fourth, the shift from
the post war GATT arrangements which emphasize liberal international
trade and non tariffs barriers in trade and investment to a new arrange¬
ment which emphasize "most favored nation treatment, reciprocity and
18
tariff restrictions." The collapse of these post war trade arrange¬
ments was initated by the U.S, with the passage of the Trade Expansion
Act in 1962. The trade restrictions to the markets of developed capital¬
ist countries affected the underdeveloped nations who lacked the where¬
withal to Impose counter tariff. It also created serious economic pro¬
blems since the development program of third world countries is either
16
C.F. Bergsten, Managing International Economic Interdependence
(Lexington: Lexington Books, 1977) pp. 6-11.
17
W.G. Tyler, Issues and Prospects for the New International Economic




based on import substitution or export oriented development.
Fifth, the collapse of the first U.K, development decade and the
mounting evidence by mid 70s that the target of the second development
decade would not be achieved by the end of the 70s. After the end of
first development decade a new target of 6 percent average annual rate
of growth of GNP for underdeveloped countries was established. The dev¬
eloped countries were again charged with an official development assist¬
ance of 0.7 percent of total GNP.
The assumption here just as it was during the first development
decade is that an outflow of 0.7 percent of GNP official aid from devel¬
oped to underdeveloped countries and the achievement of 6 percent annual
rate of growth in underdeveloped countries would restore poor countries
economy to something that would be able to secure minimum standard of
living for its people. But by the end of 1976 prospects that the
6 percent average annual growth rate of GNP could be achieved had dimin¬
ished. Agricultural production dropped from 2.8 percent in average annual
rate of growth between 1961-1971 to 2.0 percent between 1970-1975. Food
production for the same period dropped from 3.0 percent to 2.2 percent.
The manufacturing sector which had increased in its total output at an
average rate of 7.0 percent in 1971 and 9.0 percent in 1972-73 had decrea-
19
sed to an average of 6.0 percent in 1975. In trade the situation did
not fare better. The volme of imports of non-oil producing countries
of the underdeveloped nations declined at an annual rate of 2.2 percent
and the rate of growth of export of their purchasing power fell by 3 per-
19
UNCTAD Document, Review of International Trade and Development
(UNCTAD Pub. 1977) p. 7.
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cent per annum in 1970-1976.
Overall there was an "absolute decline" in the average annual rate of
growth of GNP and per capita GNP for most third world countries (see table
10 on page 69). But if we calculate the overal aggregate rate of growth
of GNP for all underdeveloped countries as indicated in the above table on
page 69 we would register an average annual rate of growth of more than the
21
U.N. 6.0 percent target. The same was true in the growth of volume of
their imports which grew at an average rate of 2.0 percent. But if we
breakdown the overall figure between oil exporter and non-oil exporter
countries the latter total output grew at an average rate of 2 percent per
annum. This showed an absolute decline of 2 percent when compared to the
22
4 percent rate of growth achieved in the 1960-1970.
At the same period 1970-1975, price increases added $56.3 billion in¬
to the deficit of non-oil producing countries. Of this total amount,
import of manufactured goods added $27.3 billion, petroleum added $19.5
billion and primary commodities $9.5 billion. If this is put against their
20
Ibid. p. 9. But if we eliminate trade transactioons for 1971-72,
the two years before the recession in OECD countries and before the 1973-74
quadrupling of the price of petroleum, the actual growth rate of their
purchasing power fell by 6.0 percent per annum in 1973-76.
21
This is the fundamental drawback of using economic growth as the sole
measure of economic development. The latter only analyzes changes in the
value of economic parameters by using short-run determinants factors such
as income, goods and services produced in a given institutional conditions.
It ignores socio-political factors such as income distribution, how the goods
were produced, and under what condition were services rendered. It treats





GNP growth rates; key results so far in the Second Development Decade by major developing
country categories
(Including adjustments for changes in the terms of trade)
All other developing countries
Remaining countries
All Major Fast-growing Per Capita Per Capita Least
developing petroleum manufacturing GNP GNP developed
countries exporters Total exporters Total $250 or above under $250 countries
Population (millions) 1975 1867 293 1574 107 1467 450 1017 245
Per capita income (dollars) 1975 382 606 340 1008 292 638 138 128
(at average 1973-75 prices).
Growth rates (average annual
percentage changes):
GNP A B A B A B A B A B A B A B A B
1960-1970 5.3 5.2 6.0 5.9 5.2 5.1 8.2 7.9 4.6 4.5 5.1 5.0 3.8 3.8 3.4 3.4
1970-1975 6.9 5.5 17.0 7.6 4.5 5.1 5.7 6.7 4.2 4.7 5.4 6.0 2.1 2.4 2.5 2.7
1970-1980 target:6.0
1970-1973 6.3 6.0 10.4 7.9 5.5 5.6 7.3 7.6 5.0 5.2 6.8 6.9 2.1 2.2 2.7 2.6
1973-1975 7.9 4.0 27.5 6.0 3.0 3.6 3.4 4.1 2.9 3.5 3.3 3.9 2.1 2.6 2.3 2.8
Per capita GNP:
1960-1979 2.8 2.7 3.3 3.2 2.7 2.6 5.4 5.1 2.2 2.1 2.4 2.3 1.5 1.5 0.9 0.9
1970-1975 4.3 2.9 14.0 4.8 2.0 2.5 2.8 3.8 1.8 2.2 2.6 3.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2
1970-1980 target: 3.5
1970-1973 3.7 3.4 7.6 5.2 2.9 3.1 4.4 4.7 2.5 2.6 4.0 4.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.1
1973-1975 5.3 1.5 24.3 3.3 0.5 1.1 0.6 1.3 0.5 1.0 0.6 1.2 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.3
A= real growth rate, adjusted for changes in terms of trade.
B = unadjusted real growth rate. ctnVD
Source: Reproduced from UNCTAD Document, 5gyiew_oj^|aternationaXTrade ^d_Pjve]pprnent^(UNCTAD Pub. 1977) p. 3.
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gain of $35.5 billion in exports we still have $20 billion trade deficits.
The second development decade was not only marked by the decline in
average growth rate of GNT, agricultural and food production, and an incre¬
ased deficit, it was also marked by the decline in capital flow from devel¬
oped capitalist countries to the poor nations. By the end of 1974 the total
share of the official development assistance from developed capitalist coun¬
tries to underdeveloped countries was 0.33 percent as compared with the
target of 0.7 percent. For the U.S. the share was 0.25 of total GNP, in
comparison with 0.35 percent in 1968, and less than that for the remaining
24
OECD countries.
Sixth, the creation of UNCTAD. This in itself was an indication that
third world countries had recognized in the early 60s that the post war
institutions are not equipped to deal with third world development. The
developed capitalist countries were opposed to the creation of UNCTAD but
third world nations insisted and UNCTAD was created. Its creation helped
to establish structure that provides commonality of interest between coun¬
tries of third world.
Seventh, the increase in external financial debt of underdeveloped
countries. The burden of external debts and debt service represent one of
the major drain on the economies of third world. In 1961 when the first
development decade of the U.N. was inaugurated and the official development
assistance of 1 percent of total GNP was established the external financial
23
Ibid, p. 10. Also this does not mean that the OPEC countries regist¬
ered trade surplus in the period we are discussing. As indicated on table
13, page 113, OPEC actually registered a $2 billion trade deficit to the U.S
alone between 1974-1977.
24
UNCTAD Document (TD/183/Rev.1) p. 45 for the 1968 official develop¬
ment assistance figures see table 6 on page 58.
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debt of underdeveloped countries was $2].,587 million. The debt-service
flows for that year was $2,3}4 million. By ]968 the debt had increased
to $47,542 million with the debt-service increased to $4,0J8 million.
The total culmulative debt for the first development decade 1961-68 was
25
$282,269 million with a cumulative debt-service flow of $25,872 million.
By the end of 1973, the total cumulative long-term debt for sixty-
seven third world countries (excluding OPEC) had reached $70.8 billion,
with a short-term debt of $8.1 billion. In 1975 after the increase in the
price of oil and the unprecedented jump in the price of fertilizer the
long-term debt had increased to $105.6 billion with a short-term debt total¬
ed $17.9 billion. The figures in table 11 below and table 12 on page 72
Table 11
Projected Debt-Service Flows, 1976
Implicit Service Projected Service Flow
Rates in ($ million)
Amorti¬ Amorti¬
Interest zation zation
Types of Debt (percent) (years) Interest Total
Suppliers' Credits 5.42 4.67 428 1,692 2,120
Bank Credits 7.72 7.30 1,729 3,068 4,797
Other Private Credits 5.52 9.17 414 818 1,232
International Org. 4.86 23.25 1,016 899 1,915
DAC Governments 2.90 17.24 1,032 2,065 3,097
East Bloc Governments 1.66 9.43 85 541 626
Other Governments^ 2.90 17.24 181 360 541
Total, Long-tem Debt - - 4,885 9,443 14,328-
Estimate, 1974° - - 3,126 6,459 9,585
Increase, 1974 to 1976 - - 1,759 2,984 4,743
^Actual implicit service rates were 2. 89 percent; and 10. 42 years in 1973;
it is assumed here, however, that the relevant rates for this category,
dominated now by debts to oil-exporting countries, resemble rates on debts
^to DAC governments.
Sum of projected flows.
Source: J.N. Bhagwati, The New International Economic Order; The North-
South Debate (Mass: M.I.T. Press 1977) pp, 52-53.
25




An Estimate of Debt-Service Flows on Short-Term
Debt 1974 and 1976
Amount ($ million)
Item
Interest on Short-Term Debt
To U.S. Banks
To U.S. Nonbanking Concerns
Total Interest
Amortization of Increase in
Short-Term Debt
To U.S. Banks
To U.S. Nonbanking Concerns
Total Amortization
Total Interest and Amortization
Debt-Service Flow, All Debt^
Rate 1974 1976
7.72 percent 463 1,119
5.42 percent^ 114 184





^Average rate for long-term bank credits
^Average rate for long-term suppliers' credits.
^Sum of short-term debt, above, and long-term debt from Table 11.
Source: Bhagwati. Op. Cit. pp. 52-53
show Kenens estimate and projection of debt-service flows on short debt and
26
long-term debt for 1974 and 1976. As the figures in table 12 dramatize
debt-service flows on short-term debt alone had risen above $10 billion in
1974 and above $17 billion in 1976. The debt-service flows on long-term
for 1974 was more than $9 billion and above $14 billion in 1976 (see table
11). This means that debt-service flows for long-term debt from 1974 to 1976
increased at the rate of $4.7 billion and for short-term debt at the rate
26
Bhagwati, Op. Cit. pp. 51-54
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of $7 billion in less than two years.
The above figures show why the debt and debt-service problems have
drifted to the top of the proposal for a NIEO. This is because the bur¬
den of debt and debt-service on underdeveloped (especially, the non-oil
producing countries) economies have reached a "point where the import
"28
capacity as well as reserves have come under serious strain. We
shall dwell more on this issue in the next chapters. In the mean time I
shall return to some of the factors which contributed to the collapse of
the post war order and subsequently precipitated the demand for a NIEO.
Eighth, the outbreak of the 1973 Middle East War and the success of
OPEC. This factor, more than 1971 world wide recession which I pointed
out earlier increased the awareness of third world countries about the
degree to which developed capitalist countries are dependent on their
major resources.
The final factor which has helped to weaken the post war economic
order is the Increasing success of the world socialist revolution and the
activities of those socialist countries to reduce their dependency on (the
key Institutions of) imperialism.
All of the above factors; the persistent balance of payments deficit,
deteriorating terms of trade, political instability, vulnerability to
economic instability and inflationary pressures from developed capitalist
countries, increase in external financial debts and debt-service and many
others not discussed here represents the culmination of a series of his¬






THE NORTH - SOUTH DEBATE ON A NEW INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORDER: CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE
The attempt to reform the postwar international order started in the
early 50s with the activities of the non-aligned nations. This was mark¬
ed with conciliatory attitude in such international fora as UNCTAD. But
this changed to a more militant stance in the 70s as "frustrations re¬
sulting from more than a decade of largely fruitless efforts to obtain
international consideration and implementation of (underdeveloped states)
1
proposals" began to accumulate.
The activities of non-aligned nations started with the Bandung
Conference of Afro-Asia countries in 1955, when several third world na¬
tions met and declared themselves non-aligned to the East-West Cold War
bipolar security system. They also asserted (being the first time a
group of third world countries did so) that the problem of economic devel¬
opment in the underdeveloped world is a problem of the whole international
2
community. The conference Issued communique on economic cooperation
called for "International economic cooperation based on mutual interest
and respect of national sovereignty," and "collective action towards sta-
_
G.F. Erb and V. Kallab, Beyond Dependency (Washington: D.C.
ODC: 1975) p. 146.
2
A. W. Singham, The Nonaligned Movement in World Politics,
Connecticut: Lawrence Hill, 1977) p. 178.
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blllzing international prices of primary products and demand for these
articles by means of bilateral and multilateral agreements...for Afro-
Asian countries to diversify their exports, and to process their own
raw materials before exporting them wherever this is economically
3
possible."
This emphasis on the role of the international economic system in
the development of the underdeveloped countries that gained momentum
with the nonaglined movement has its root in the economic doctrine of
Raul Prebisch. It is this doctrine which was first enuciated when
Prebisch was the Secretary-General of the Economic Commission for Latin
America in the AOs that has sustained all third world demands until
today.
The Importance of the doctrine rest in its scientific demonstration
of the unequal distribution of the benefits from technological progress
and international trade, an unequal distribution which favors the ad¬
vanced capitalist countries while further impoverishing and disadvan¬
taging the underdeveloped countries.
The thesis, which is often referred to as the theory of terms of
trade, demonstrates that the price of raw materials produced in periph¬
ery of the capitalist system has been deteriorating in relative terms to
the price of industrial products produced in center since 1870s. The
reasons, according to Prebisch, is that wages and profits in center of




In the periphery of the system the rate of increase in wages and profits
has declined when compared to productivity. He (Prebisch) points out
that the continuous increase in incomes in advanced capitalist countries
and the decline in the underdeveloped countries are due to two factors:
firstly, technology disparity between the two. This technology dispa¬
rity results from the fact that the economies in the center is intro¬
verted, self-reliant and self-sustaining through continuous technologi¬
cal innovations and progress, whereas in the periphery, the economies
takes extroversion character, dependent and playing the role of raw
material exporter to the center and importers of industrial products
from the center. Secondly, deterioration in terms of trade, which re¬
sults from low income-elasticity of demand for third world primary
4
products.
The reproduction of these two factors maintain an International
economic structure that allows the distribution of benefits from tech¬
nological progress and international trade to favor the advanced capital¬
ist countries and disadvantaging the underdeveloped countries. Prebisch
felt that the only way this can be overcome is to raise the level of
productivity through industrialization. And the "industrialization pro¬
cess should be promoted through import substitution, so that at the same
time the terms of trade were improved, an increased capacity to Import
would develop, a capacity necessary to confront the large capital needs
4
Luis E.D. Marco, "The Evolution of Preblshch's Economic Thought"
in International Economics and Development (NY: Academic Press, 1972)




The consequences of the above doctrine for economic policy and plan¬
ning in underdeveloped countries will not be considered in this study.
However it is necessary to note that the Prebisch propositions led third
world countries to pursue import-substitutions industrialization in the
40s, 50s and 60s.
In 1961 at the conference of heads of state or government of non-
aligned countries held in Belgrade, the Afro-Asian countries reiterate
the position that was taken in Bangdung. Ttey called for "equitable con¬
ditions of trade" and for measures to "prevent excessive fluctations in
the trade of raw materials and to abolish restrictions that have a nega-
6
tlve effect on the trade of developing countries."
At the Conference on Economic Development of Developing Countries
held in Cairo in 1962, the non-aligned countries met again with the
attitude of Bandung and Belgrade. This time "the idea had evolved of
the need to find a special international institution which would deal
firstly with problems related to the economic position of developing
7
countries within the international community." This initiative led to
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Inspite of the above conciliatory demands and of the fact that the
problem of primary products predominate the demand of third world coun¬
tries, the developed capitalist countries ignored these demands and even
objected to the creation of UNCTAD. But the spirit of Bandung, Belgrade
and Cairo forced the formation of UNCTAD and within its "organs the de¬
veloping countries acquired the possibility of establishing a common
platform and high degree of unity within this new international commu-
8
nity."
At the first UNCTAD in 1964 the third world countries pressed their
claims by calling on developed capitalist countries to stabilize prices
for primary products and eliminate tariffs restrictions "which prevent
developing countries from marketing products of exceptional importance
9
to their export trade." The developed capitalist countries ignored the
demands made by UNCTAD I and the previous conferences. The reason for
this was that the period 1950 and 1970 were the halcyon days of unpar-
alel economic growth of imperialist capitalism. A period in "which most
of the world's industrial capacity was created" through a "stimulated
demand of raw materials,...fired by abundant and cheap supplies" of one
10
dollar a barrel of oil. This growth increased the material prosper¬
ity of most of the people of the developed capitalist countries, increa¬
sed their income per capital and reinforced the accumulation of scien¬
tific knowledge. For the people of the third world their situation










In 1968, again in 1972, the third world nations through UNCTAD II
and III pressed their claims and encountered similar difficulties. By
this time the instabilities of the postwar international economic ord¬
er had become apparent to developed capitalist countries themselves.
The threat of trade war that results from customs tariff and non-tar¬
iff restrictions among developed capitalist countries, rising prices
of manufactured goods and raw material shortage, increasing unemploy¬
ment, rising inflation, and the mounting huge deficit of OECD coun¬
tries were compounded by the U.S. decision to devalue the dollar.
Even before the U.S. devaluded the dollar in 1971, the rate of growth
of industrial production for all OECD countries had started to decline.
Paul Sweezy has attributed this to the "self-expanding value" of capi¬
tal. According to Sweezy the tendency of capitalism to maximize sur¬
plus value and to reinvest it "in additional production" leads to
"double tendency to accelerate society's power to produce while at the
same time restraining its capacity to consume." The existence of this
tendencies to "unlimited expansion and production and restricted con¬
sumption" creates underlying contradiction in capitalism. When this
contradiction "exerts itself...it assumes the form" of economic crisis
e.g. recession, depression, slow down of the rate of growth, stagnation
11
etc - which can only be resolved through "basic changes."
However, the devaluation of U.S. dollar unmasked the inescapable
inadequacies of the monetary system that had functioned to the advantage
n
P. Sweezy, "The Present Global Crisis of Capitalism," Monthly Review
Vol. 29 No. 11 (April, 1978) pp. 1-12.
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of imperialist capitalism for more than three decades. The action lead to
worldwide inflation, financial disruption, trade dislocations, increased
balance of pa5mient difficulties, prices of primary products fluctuated
with the disrupted markets, and prices of industrial products skyrockedted
because of the strong Jump in labor productivity in developed capitalist
12
countries. The foundation of the Bretton Woods System, fixed exchange
rates against the dollar collapsed and was abandoned for floating exchange
rates. In such a disrupted international atmosphere, the third world
countries who were the most affected by the trade dislocations pressed
hard for international monetary and trade reforms. The developed capita¬
list countries became more defensive and refused to cooperate on any in¬
ternational reforms.
The major turning point came with the outbreak of the Middle East
War in 1973. In response to the arrongance of developed capitalist coun¬
tries and their support for Israel, the Organization of Arab Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OAPEC) Imposed an oil embargo on the west, first as
a retaliation, then came the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) price increase. Despite the negative impact of the price Increase
on the economies of non-oil producing underdeveloped countries it was
supported by every nation of the underdeveloped world. The U.S. tried to
rally oil consuming nations to break the embargo and prevent the price
increase, but the selected embargo used by OAPEC failed the U.S. effort.
12
J. Tinbergen, Reshaping the International Order (NY: Dutton Co.,
1976), pp. 12 - 13.
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Thus, the earlier conciliatory attitude of underdeveloped countries
and the arrogance of developed capitalist countries grew into militant
confrontation. At the request of Algeria (the first third world country
to have made such request) the UN General Assembly convened in special
session to consider the problems of the present international economic
order. Prior to the Algeria request the non-aligned countries met in
Algeria and discussed economic problems that faced third world nations.
Out of the conference came the Economic Declaration and its Action Pro¬
gramme.
Nevertheless, the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly
met in April, 1974 to deal directly with international economic prob¬
lems. Out of it came the Declaration and Action Programme on the Esta¬
blishment of a New International Economic Order. Despite the fact that
many of the provisions of the declaration were reproduced from previous
third world demands in UNCTAD conferences and international development
strategies subscribed to in the first and second UN development decades,
the U.S. denounced the declaration as "tyranny of the majority" and
the remaining developed capitalist countries joined in the objection.
As the confrontation grew further two views emerged, those of underdevel¬
oped and the developed capitalist countries.
The developed capitalist countries conception of NIEO can be divided
in two categories, conservative and liberal. The conservatives represent¬
ed by Daniel P. Moynihan, the U.S. Ambassador at the UN when the declara¬
tion for NIEO was made contends that the demand for a NIEO is a "hangover
of British socialism" used by third world countries to turn world atten-
82
13
tion away from their own domestic mismanagement." This view which still
persist in the mainstream of western scholarship contends that the third
world nations are poor because they are politically and ideologically mis¬
guided in the way they think, in what they expect from developed capita¬
list countries and in their approach toward the west. The "Spencerian"
message was put forward that the third world must only blame themselves
for their misery, and that they shall not expect the developed capitalist
countries to serve them their prosperity on the silver platter of aid.
Third world countries are urged to learn the virtues of "western democ-
14
racy" and the liberal capitalist system. Burner not only reject out¬
right the idea of NIEO he contends that such demand reflects "ingrati¬
tude" on the part of the third world who recjected the virtues of coloni-
15
allsm without first learning the "social rules" of democracy.
The liberal view on the other hand recognized the need for a NIEO.
This view which has been expressed largely by imperialist capitalism thro¬
ugh the Club of Rome - Reshaping the International Order, the U.S. Over¬
seas Development Council and the Trilateral Commission support NIEO for
following reasons; l)the fear of revolution of rising expectations in
the third world, 2)the acceptance that the postwar International economic
order has broken down due to the global crisis of capitalism, e.g., the
13
M. U1 Haq, The Poverty Curtain (N.Y.: Columbia Univ. Press, 1976)
p. 144.
14
J. Amuzegar, "The North-South Dialogue" Foreign Affairs Vol. 54,
No 3 (April 1976) pp. 547-562.
15
K. Burner, "The International Order" Orbis Vol 20 No 1 (Spring 1976)
pp. 103-121.
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economics crisis in Europe, the consistent devaluation of the U.S. dollar
and the increasing inflation rates and balance of payment problems, 3)the
belief that the third world ruling class increasing demand for equality
among states cannot be substituted, 4)the recognition of the dependency
of western capitalist economy on third world resources, and 5)western
imperialist's commitment to maintain "peace" and "stability" in the world.
Thus, inspite of the differences between the conservative and the
liberal view, the letters theoretical discussion of the issue of the NIEO
and the solutions it perceived are based on the assvimption that western
capitalism must be strengthened. This is exemplified in the work of one
of their leading strategists like C.F. Bergsten (1973), (1974) and (1975).
The major premises of Bergsten who is aspiring to play the role of steward
transition is that the power of western capitalism has been threatened and
in order to avoid total breakdown, accommodation that would allow for the
reform of the postwar international economic order are necessary. It is
very difficult to discern a northern homogeneous view because of the
rivalry among the imperialists themselves for further expansion, domination
of larger markets and more influence in the underdeveloped nations. How-
16
ever the following seem to summarize developed capitalist countries view.
l)The notion that developed capitalist countries must evolve a system that
will guarantee non-discrimination and maximum freedom for international
transactions on a short and long term basis; 2)that in order to realize
16
This has been taken from J. Tinbergen, Reshaping the International
Order and the Joint Japanese-American View: Toward a New International
Economic Order, (paraphrasing is mine).
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the basic principle of comparative advantage in international interactions,
temporary adjustment will be necessary. Such adjustment must contribute
to a balanced development of the domestic economy of all countries and
provide for smooth industrial adjustment that can take account of social
cost such as those extended in environmental Improvement, and they must
help close the gap between the developed and underdeveloped economies; 3)
that the developed capitalist must maintain the current trend towaid lib¬
eralization of International trade and investment and avoid exporting
domestic problems such as inflation to other countries; 4)that the devel¬
oped capitalist countries must consider and support the effective planning
and management to ensure production and trade in few productions, petroleum,
and other basic resources; 5)that the global national economic growth
must be broadened to acconnnodate appropriate non-market objectives such
as the resolution of social conflict, a higher standard of living, envi¬
ronment improvements, and the efficient use of energy and other scarce
resources; and 6)that the UN system must be reformed and improved to accom¬
modate the security of world community and the development of third world.
The south's conception of a NIEO differs from the northern view. The
views that have emerged from the South fall into two categories: the rul¬
ing bourgeoisie's view which find expression in the proposal for a NIEO,
and the view propounded by some scholars of the third world. This latter
17
view has rejected the demand for a NIEO as reformist, economically
17
For example see S. Amin, "Self-Reliance and the NIEO" and J Galtung,
"The New Economic Order in World Politics" in A.W. Singham, The Nonaligned
Movement in World Politics, CConnecticut; Lawrence Hill, 1977) Part Four.
Also see H. Magdoff, "Limits of International Reform" Monthly Review Vol 30
No 1 (May 1978) p. 1-11.
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ineffective and politically unfeasible. But for our purpose here we shall
concentrate on the ruling bourgeoisie’s view.
The view of the south can best be understood by going back to the two
resolutions endorsed by the UN special session on Raw Material and Develop¬
ment in April-May 1974; the declaration on the establishment of a NIEO and
the program of action designed to Implement the declaration. These reso¬
lutions were adopted by the General Assembly in December, 1974 and put
together in a Chapter of Economic Rights and Duties of States in December,
18
1975. The major points which appeared in the NIEO declaration and had
not been present in the demands of the past are:
4Ce) Full permanent sovereignty of every state over its
natural resources and all economic activities. This
includes the right to nationalize and transfer owner¬
ship to nationals. (While paying compensation according
to domestic, rather than international law).
4(f) Reparations to states and peoples under foreign
occupation, alien and colonial domination or apartheid...
4(g) Regulation and supervision of the activities of trans¬
national corporations by taking measures in the interest
of the national economics of the host countries...^^
These three elements and the resolution expressing the right of coun¬
tries to form producers association similar to OPEC aroused the strongest
objections of developed capitalist countries. After a period of nearly
one year of confrontation between North and South a "consensus resolution"
of the seventh special session of the UN General Assembly was "adopted
without a vote." This new procedure allows resolutions to be passed while
18





accommodating "situations in which no group of countries chooses formally
20
to record its oppositon." Even before the voting system was evolved
the third world had dropped resolution 4Ce) above, and the right of coun¬
tries to form producers associations.
Before exploring the major premises of third world’s long standing
demand, it is necessary to point out the essentials the NIEO calls for:
1)expanding and diversifying trade. Improving productivity and increas¬
ed export earning of the war developed countries; 2)improved terms of
trade for raw materials products; 3)securing stable, renumeratlve and
equitable prices for exported raw materials and protecting their pur¬
chasing power from market fluctuations; 4)reducing or removing custom
tariffs and non-tariffs restrictions affecting the underdeveloped coun¬
tries exports; 5)Increasing the volimie and improving the terms of devel¬
opment assistance; 6)achieving the official development assistance tar¬
get of 0.7 percent of GNP by the end of the second development decade;
7)increasing the underdeveloped countries access on favorable terms to
world capital markets; 8)relieving debt burdens of the most seriously
affected countries; 9)giving the third world a greater voice in the
management of international financial institutions and longer access to
their resources on terms favorable to underdeveloped countries; 10)increas¬
ing international control and surveillance over the creation and equit¬




industrialization in underdeveloped countries through the transfer of
21
technology and Investment.
The major propositions upon which the above essentials are call¬
ed for and the demand for a NIEO based Include: l)the assumption that
"the goal of autonomous capitalist development in the third world
22
countries " is possible; 2)assumption that UN and its organized
framework provides international planning and management for inter¬
national bargaining under conditions of relative equality; 3) the
assumption that the success of OPEC represents shift of power from
developed capitalist countries to third world or to primary product
23
producers; 4)the assumption that western capitalism is capable of
resolving the present global crisis and will be amenable to problems
of third world; 5)in a world of interdependence neither north or
south can survive without cooperation and compromises; 6)the assump¬
tion that the third world is morally right and justified to get re¬
paration for past wrongs, e.g., economic exploitation 7)non-allgn-
ment and collective self-reliance based on labor union activism
would guarantee developed capitalist countries duty to transfer real
resources; 8) that imperialist capitalism is conducive to the NIEO;
etc., etc.
21
J. Amuzegar, "The North-South Dialogue" Foreign Affairs Vol 54
No 3 (April 1976) p. 547-582.
22
S. Amin, "Self-Reliance and a NIEO" Monthly Review Vol 29 No 3
(July-August 1977) p. 2,
23
J. Howe, "Power in the Third World" Journal of International
Affairs, Vo. 29 No 2 (Fall 1975) pp. 113-127.
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In view of all of the above claims and counter claims, established
and legitimized on the basis of illusions of shifting power, past wrongs
and obligations, I have devoted chapter five to examine the trends of
the debate on a NIEO and to assess its short and long term impact on
the development of third world countries.
PART III
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER AND THE
FUTURE OF THE UNDERDEVELOPED WORLD
CHAPTER V
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, ITS
IMPACT ON THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY SYSTEM
The demand for a NIEO has entered a new phase since the U.N. declara¬
tion in 1974. The appeal to capitalist imperialism to reform the postwar
economic order has been made through formal declarations of principle to
consensus resolutions. The underdeveloped countries have clearly asserted
their legitimate aspirations for a global redistribution of wealth and
power on a fairer and more equitable basis. The declarations and resolu¬
tions demanding economic independence from capitalist imperialism can be
summed up in two kinds of demands: demand for more influence and partici¬
pation of the underdeveloped nations in the operation of international
political economic systems and more benefits for the countries from the
1
operation of the system.
These demands are genuine, especially if we consider the impact of
the asymmetric international relationship we have discussed in chapters
two and three. The demands seem more important if we further consider
that virtually every international (and national) economic and
1
J. Howe, "Power in the Third World," Journal of International
Affairs, Vol 29, No 29 (Fall 1975) pp. 113-127.
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political fora since the U.N. declaration in 1974 has had to reckon
with the issues of a new world economic order.
Equally important is that the demand for a NIEO is a "crisis
of imperialism," especially if we consider that virtually all the
ills that the demand is designed to correct have resulted from the
historical accumulations of imperialist oppression and exploitation
of Third World peoples. Since the crisis has now manifested itself
in a conflict between Imperialism and the bourgeoisie of the
Third World in the demand for a NIEO, it is unlikely the conflict
will be resolved until a new international economic arrangement
has evolved. Thus, whether one accepts the view that the evolve-
ment of NIEO would enhance development in the underdeveloped nations
of the world or the view that the NIEO constitutes a bourgeois de¬
mand used by third world leaders to deflect attention away from
problems that require internal solution, the present conflict be¬
tween Imperialism and the third world would likely be resolved in
a new form of international division of labor. The form and content
of this new international division of labor when fully emerged would
represent the watershed of the present proposal for a NIEO and the
postwar order.
How then do we assess this great issue of the NIEO without
falling into emotionalism characteristic of ideological debate?
In order to do this we attempt to do the following in this chapter:
firstly, to examine what has been referred to as the "principal
O
fruits of the NIEO" toward the attainment of an equitable inter-
See Fishlow. A, et al. Rich and Poor Nations in the World Economy,
(N.Y: McGraw-Hill Books, 1978), p. 12.
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national economic arrangement. By this I mean that Jamaica Reform of the
International Monetary Fund, the Conference on International Economic Co¬
operation (1975 CIEC) and the UNCTAD (IV) Conference in Nairobi in 1976.
Secondly, to examine whether the proposed means by the Third World ruling
class for a NIEO can lead to the attainment of the advocated goals. In
this case the goals of autonomous capitalist development in the Third World.
Thirdly, to examine whether a NIEO geared toward capitalist industriallza
tion and development in Third World would enhance developmentof Third World
peoples.
Following the U.N. General Assembly Seventh Special Session in which
the consensus resolution on a NIEO was adopted, a special session was held
in Jamaica to reform the IMF System in accordance with the NIEO. At the
session often referred to as "Jamaica Accord" a "reform package" for a
"New Bretton Wood" monetary system was openly arrived at.
Prior to the Jamaican session the Third World ruling class made a
"significant breakthrough" by increasing their representation on the
Development Committee of the IMF and World Bank. A committee that was
jointly established after the U.N. declarations for a NIEO by the two
institutions to devise means of increasing the transfer of financial
resources from the center to periphery. There was also an Increase of
Third World members to nine out of a twenty man committee of the IMF
that was established to plan reform of the new monetary system. In the
proposal for a NIEO the Third World nations had it made clear that they
3
would want the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) linked to development aid. This
3
The "link" is an arrangement whereby newly created IMF funds can
be linked to development aid. This would mean that member countries can
fraw from the fund not according to the proporation to their development
needs.
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would mean, that SDK's would not be allocated in proportion, to
quotas, but instead in proportion to development needs of member
states, the poorest underdeveloped nations would receive according
to their development needs and not according to their quotas.
The Third World nations also wanted a stable internationally accept¬
able currency which would not fluctuate with inflation, devalua¬
tion of currencies and deterioration in the terms of trade of the
countries of the center. Inspite of the above wishes of the Third
World ruling class and of the NIEO, the Jamaica reform package as
observed by Amuzegar brought the following benefits to Third World
nations: 1) There was an Increase in the quotas of Third World
nations from $7.5 billion units of SDRs to $12 billion (from 26
percent to 32 percent); 2) the reform package enlarged Third
World use of fund resources for development projects that would
not have qualified before the reform; 3) it set up a new trust
fund through which underdeveloped nations can draw on the profits
accruing "from the open market sale of one-sixth of the funds gold;"
4) an early review of the new IMF policy that would allow member
states "special rights to draw" from the fund whenever it is con¬
fronted with temporary balance of payments deficits; and 5) a
resolution that required the review of IMF fund quotas every three
years instead of the previous five years time. The developed
capitalist countries on the other hand realized the following
benefits from the reform package: 1) the temporary floating exchange
rates that were established after the 1971 monetary crisis in place
of the fixed exchange rates were legalized "along with the aboli¬
tion of the official price of gold and the elimination of the obli-
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gation to use gold in transactions with the fund." This would
mean in effect that the central banks would have the freedom "to
buy and sell gold in the market at market related prices;" 2) the
plan to return to fixed exchange rates based on par value system and
members collaboration to promote stable exchange rate system, "and
to avoid manipulating exchange rates" which led to unfair competition
and the 1971 monetary crisis; and 3) "the restitution of some 25
million ounces of IMF gold to member countries in proportion to
their quotas (thus tilting the distribution of increased global
liquidity in favor of developed capitalist countries)."^ Without
going into a long debate over whether the new arrangements would
impede or enhance the flow of financial resources from the center
to the periphery, there is nothing in the reform package that indi¬
cates any basic change from the Bretton Woods Monetary System.
What has evolved were para-institutions created as a supplement
to the existing institutions of imperialism. Amazegar summarized
the outcome of the Jamaica Systems in the following words:
the final package had something for everyone, in
a realistic, pragmatic quid pro. What the poor
nations received was no longer a reflection of
the rich countries' generosity or charity, but
a price for agreeing to the item which essentially
benefitted the rich — items in which the poor had
no real or immediate interest.^
^J. Amuzegar, "The North-South Dialogue" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54,
No. 3 (April, 1976), pp. 547-562.
5lbid, p. 552.
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The Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEO)
was convened by OECD countries. The CIEO was not convened to discuss
problems of the underdeveloped nations or the implementation of the
proposals of the NIEO. The conference was intended to deal with the
issues of energy between oil exporting countries and oil Importing
countries. But at the insistence of oil producers and with France's
support the conference was modified to encompass a more general dis¬
cussion about aid, commodity, trade flows, transfer of technology, etc.
The Paris Conference which was probably the longest conference on
North-South economic relations lasted for 18 months. At the beginning
of the conference three ministerial level negotiating committees were
set up to deal with the issue of energy and financial matters, raw
6
materials and aid.
The Third World nations which were represented by 19 states (7
OPEC nations and 12 non-oil producing nations) demanded the following:
1) a moratorium on debt payments that was estimated at about $200 bil¬
lion at the time of the conference. The moratorium was requested, in
particular for the very poorest countries of the Third World whose
debt out of the total $200 billion was more than $40 billion; 2) a
request for the stabilization of raw material prices (latest by the end
of 1977) through commodity agreements that would be financed from a
7
Common Fund. The Common Fund was not to be less than $6 billion.
6
New York Times (June 2, 1977) p. 1-2,
7
Since the conference ended in Paris about three years ago negotiations
have continued on the Common Fund. It was placed on the agenda of UNCTAD VI
but was rejected by OECD countries. After three years of confrontation, the
London based West African Magazine reports on 26 March 1979 that 101 nations
at the U.N. Conference in Geneva had agreed on the creation of the Common
Fund. The reports indicate that what has emerged in Geneva in place of that
$6 billion proposed in Paris was a $750 million fund.
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Similar to this stabilization of raw material prices was the request for
indexing of raw material prices. This is sometimes called "pegging."
What this amounts to is that by pegging raw material prices to the rate
of world inflation, as the underdeveloped countries demanded a permanently
higher raw materials prices would be assured and fluctuations would be
prevented; 3) a request for firm commitment by the advanced capitalist
countries to meet the 0.7 percent of GNP in official development assist-
8
ance.
The development capitalist countries in their package proposed to
offer the following: 1) an additional $1 billion in aid with promise that
a substantial amount of the money will go to the very poorest countries
of the underdeveloped nations; 2) a promise to step us third world export
earnings through the removal of tariff and non-tariff restrictions on
third world exports; 3) an agreement in principle to stabilize certain raw
material prices. This would mean returning to the case-by-case approach
to commodity prices the third world has been trying to alter since UNCTAD
I; 4) the demand by advanced capitalist countries for the establishment of
9
a permanent World Energy Forum. In addition to the above concessions
and demands of the advanced capitalist countries, they opposed ' Indexing
of raw materials prices and refused to be committed to stabilization plans.
8
New York Times CJune 2, 1977) p. 1-2 also see The Economist (June
4, 1977) p. 97.
9
The Economist (June 4, 1977) p. 97. The Conference was Initially
intended to bring non-oil producing third world countries in to world
energy forum that would be able to curtail the power of the OPEC. But
non-OPEC third world nations at the conference (with the exception of
(Saudi Arabia) refused to get into oil consumers alliance with the OECD
against OPEC.
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The OECD countries also rejected the $6 billion Common Fund proposed by the
underdeveloped nations as too high and also was the demand for moratorium
on debt payments.
The third world on the other hand rejected the idea of establishing
world energy forum for continuing talks between oil exporters and consumers.
The six OPEC members (excluding Saudi Arabia), and the twelve non-oil pro¬
ducing third world countries claimed that a forum that would pitch OPEC
and oil consumers of the advanced capitalist countries together would cur¬
tail the latters power to regulate oil production and prices. Since energy
was the main reason why the conference had been convened, the third world's
rejection to the creation of a permanent World Energy Forum led the confer¬
ence to breakdown several times. At one time, Saudi Arabia walked out in
protest of third world's rejection of the creation of World Energy Forum
and in support of OECD countries demand for the creation. At another time,
the OECD countries threatened to withdraw their concessions unless oil
exporters and their allies accept continuing forum on energy. The latter
insisted that the establishment of World Energy Forum woudl render OPEC
10
useless and ineffective.
At the end of the 18 months conference both parties Issued joint
communique with the third world representatives denouncing the unwilling¬
ness of OECD countries to cooperate on measures that will lead to the
implementation of the proposals of the NIEO. The OECD, on the other hand
accused the underdeveloped nations of rigidity and stubborness.




pal fruits of the NIEO, the analysis above shows that CIEO was another
North-South Conference where declarations and resolutions are often
construced:. as significant achievements. According to The Economist’s
Summary of CIEO
What has emerged from CIEO, however, was hardly a new
world order. It was more a weary recognition by both
sides that each must cooperate more closely with the
others in the future.
The UNCTAD IV which has also been suggested as one of the "principal
fruits of the NIEO" was in fact a total rejection of the NIEO by imperial¬
ism. Prior to the conference in Nairobi, the third world nations had met
in Manila to work out details for the Implementation of the NIEO and also
to present a united front proposal at the conference. At the Nairobi
conference countries were divided into four groups for the purpose of
negotiations. Group A represents the countries of Africa (excluding South
Africa) and Asia (excluding Japan). Group C represents all the countries
of Latin America. The soviet Union and the Eastern European countries
comprised group D and Western Europe, U.S.A. and Japan represent Group B.
The group A and C countries which operates through the group of 77 present¬
ed proposals for the implementation of the NIEO in four major areas:
international commodity and trade, industrialization and transfer of
technology, international financial and monetary reform and special devel¬
opment assistance to non-oil producing underdeveloped nations. The group
A and C countries requested that the International commodity market which
operates on the principles of non-interference by intergovernmental actions
and the commodities "negotiations on a case-by—case basis" be abandoned for




approach would comprise "the establishment of internatioanlly - owned stocks
covering a wide range of commodities;.a common financing fund that will
make resources available, for the acquisition of stocks," the establish¬
ment of a system that will ensure both short and long term "commitments
to purclHse and sell commodities at agreed prices;" the establishment of
an institution that will compensate commodity producers whenever there is
trade fluctation; and the establishment of programs that will "further
12
the processing of commodities by the producing countries themselves."
In the areas of transfer of technology, the group A and C requested
a massive transfer of technology but with the establishment and "an out¬
line for International code of conduct" that would govern such transfer.
The issue of financial and monetary reform was also considered. The group
A and C called for relief of the debt problems of third world nations, and
in particular, for "a moratarium on, or deferment of debt-service payment"
13
for all non-oil producing underdeveloped nations. The group even went
further to reject the previous Jamaica Reform of the IMF which was agreed
upon by both North and South in 1974 as a reform which favored the North
and would not benefit the South. They called for the expansion of official
development assistance as a percentage of GNP and for the establishment of
the "link" between SDRs and development aid.
These and several other proposals were put forward by third world
nations in accordance with the U.N. charter on the establishment of a NIEO
and the objectives of the U.N. second development decade. The demands
12
UNCTAD Document, Proceeding of the United Nations Conference on




were supported by U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe - the group D countries but
were rejected by group B - Western Europe, U.S.A. and Japan. The only
issue that group A, C and B agreed upon was the transfer of technology.
Even on this issue another bureaucratic structure was established to con¬
vene a special international conference in 1979 in order to deal with pro¬
blems of technology transfer and the code of conduct for such transfer.
The foregoing discussion partly helps to explain that there have not
been any genuinely reform of the international economic relations based
on the proposals of the NIEO. What we have seen in the case of the Jamaica
Reform, the Paris CIEC and UNCTAD IV is imperialism's rejection of the
themes of the NIEO. The reason is that the themes of the NIEO order,
involve the aspiration of third world nations to control their natural
resources and to strengthen national states, which the global corporations
see as an obstacle in transforming the world into 'bne economic unit" based
14
on a worldwide integrated capitalist productions.
The rejection of the themes of the NIEO by imperialism and the latter's
attempt to substitute the Club of Rome "RIO Project" (Reshaping Interna¬
tional Order) led us to the second question. Can the NIEO if as a result
of future miracles it is implemented lead to the development of autonomous
capitalism in the peripheries? Or put it in another language: "Can reform¬
ism lead to a genuinely new international economic order,one that is
capable of bringing about self-reliant development in the peripheriesJof the
world capitalist system?
14
Samir Amin, "The New International Economic Order," Monthly Review
Vol. 29 No. 3 (July-August 1977) pp. 20 See also Barnet R.J. and Miller,
Pv. E. Global Reach, N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1974) Part I and II.
15
H.A. Watson, "Non-agliment and the NIEO" in A.W. Singham. The Non-
aglined Movement in World Politics, (N.Y.: Westport, Lawrence Hill Co., 1978)
p.40.
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Although, one may not answer the above questions by denlng the possi¬
bility of reformism within the international economic system because of
the tendency for the present conflict on a NIEO to go any direction but
what seem certain from the above analyses of North-South negotiations is
that whatever form of economic arrangements that is evolved cannot be
adopted with the acquiescence of developed capitalist countries and since
the achievement of changes in international economic relations is based
upon the principle of negotiation which is dependent on the cooperation
and concessions of developed capitalist countries, it is unlikely that
that the developed capitalist countries would concede to any economic
arrangements that would undermine the interest of capitalist imperialism.
According to Harry Magdoff:
...the metropoles might in theory be inclined to make
concessions, especially those that would bring them
certain long-run advantages, such as securing more
reliable sources of raw materials, protecting their
multinational firms from nationalization or confiscation,
and building up junior partners prepared to help preserve
capitalism in the third world. These possible long-run
advantages, however, are offset by real and compelling
constraints in the short run. The imperialist powers
have entered a new stage of stagnation. The interna¬
tional system is shaky. World trade has slowed down.
Trade and currency competition among the leading power
has been intensifying. Every one of the industrialized
countries is confronted with Internal problems arising
from persistent unemplo3nnent and weak industrial and
financial sectors. These are hardly the conditions
under which the imperialist powers are Inclinded to
consider reforms that promise to intensify their intern¬
al contradicitons.
This, in effect means that given these tendencies and the "long-run
advantages" of imperialism in maintaining the status quo, a reform of the
16
H. Magdoff, "Limits of International Reform" Monthly Review Vol 30
No 1 (May 1978) p. 10
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international economic systems could take place. The question then is what
will be the implications of such reform for third world development and the
peoples of third world nations? In order to be able to understand the
Implications we now turn to the issue of autonomous capitalist develop¬
ment versus socialist self-reliant development in the third world nations.
In the evolution and formation of capitalism in the periphery and the
center there are development stages which account for the development of
societies based on d5niamic laws of capital accumulation and production.
The development of these stages in the capitalist center differs from the
development stages in the periphery of the world capitalist system. In
other words, what "has been the characteristic feature of the historical
development of capitalism in the center of the system (in Europe, North
17 18
America, and Japan) ...is not valid as regards the peripheries." The
development of capitalism in the center according to Samir Amin (1974),
(1976) and Paul Baran (1957) has three characteristic features; first the
development of capitalism in centers of the system "stemmed from an inter-
19
nal process of breaking-up the pre-capitalist modes of production." In
this case the feudal mode of production. The breaking-up of this mocfe of
production created an environment favorable to the development of social
relations that were conducive to the "agricultural revolution which pre-
20
cedes - and makes possible - the subsequent industrial revolution."
17
Samir Amin, "The New International Economic Order" Monthly Review








The emergence of the agricultural revolution led to the expansion of pro¬
duction in agricultural and food products and the subsequent proletarian¬
ization of the peasantry. This process of proletarianization of the popu¬
lation aided the development of agriculture. By so doing the latter was
able to increase the production of marketed food products necessary for
the reproduction of the emerging proletariat. Secondly, the new capital¬
ist relations that emerged from the agricultural revolution and the sub¬
sequent industrial revolution that began to unfold stimulated the devel¬
opment of a new "class alliance between the landowners and the emerging
industrialist and the growth of a powerful national state necessary for
the defense of the interest of the new class. Thirdly, the development
of the new class alliances and of the powerful national state allowed
the new class to subject all external relations Celther in the form of
long distance trade, slave trade, or direct colonization) to the need
and requirements of internal accumulation. This subjugation of all
external relations to the social formations of the center led to the
emergence of "a series of central formation, self-reliant and interde¬
pendent..., and of peripheral formations subjected to the logic of ac-
21
cumulation in the centers that dominate them."
Contrary to the development stages observed in the center of the
capitalist system, the introduction of capitalism to the periphery was
imposed from outside, by political and economic domination. There was no
break-up of pre-capitalist modes of production, as this was "subjected





them." This absence of proletarianization led to the marginalization of
the masses and the subsequent absence of agricultural revolution which
would have stimulated industrial revolution as was the case in the center.
Secondly, the class alliances which would have emerged to ensure the re¬
production of the new system was subordinated to the monopolies of the
center.. The national state that emerged was also subjected to the
requirements of colonial powers. And finally, in the situation of the
center where external relations were subjected to the logic of internal
accumulation, internal relations in the periphery were subjected to ex¬
ternal relations which have determined the "direction and pace of develop-
23
ment" ever since. Paul Baran summarized the situations in this manner:
...in the new backward areas this sequence Cteferring to
the sequence of development of capitalism) did not unfold
according to plan. It took a different course; division
of labor 'which' was bred by initial division of labor
resembled the apportionment of functions between a rider
and a horse. Whatever market for manufactured goods
emerged in the colonial and dependent countries did not
become the 'internal market' of these countries. Thrown
wide open by colonization and by unequal treaties, it
became an appendage of the 'internal market' of western
capitalism.
The development and reproduction of these characteristic features of
peripheral capitalism have been conditioned by three historic forms of
dependence. They are according to Dos Santos: colonial dependence, finan¬
cial industrial dependence and dependence based on foreign controlled
investment and multinational corporations. In the period of colonial
dependence which, corresponds to the "first theoretical phase of imperial¬






P. Baran, Political Economy of Growth,
p. 174.
(N.Y.: Monthly Review Press,
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monopolies. This phase of imperialism as Samir Amin noted ended "in the
victory of the national liberation movement under bourgeois leadership,"
(that is, political Independence). This victory of the national bourge¬
oisie led to development strategy based on import-substitution industria¬
lization and the development of the post war unequal international divi¬
sion of labor.
The second form of dependence, financial-industrial dependence was
stimulated with the development of monopoly capitalism in the center and
expansion of financial-capital into the peripheries of the system. This
also corresponds to the "second theoretical phase of imperialism" with all
26
the attributes of Lenin's definition of imperialism. This phase has
also extended to the post war period with a new characteristic features
aad forms of dependence and cultural imperialism. Even though this
second phase of imperialism has produced two U.N. development decades, a
tremendous growth rate higher than the post war growth rate of developed
capitalist countries, and an import-substitution industrialization in
some third world nations it continued to perpetuate the extroverted nature
of peripheral economies; the agricultural sector remained stagnant; the
dominant class alliances remained dependent and subordlanted to imperialism;
and "the continuation of development process remains dependent on exports,
27
which consists essentially of raw materials."
25
T. Dos Santos, "Structure of Dependence" in W.K. Wilber, The Politi¬
cal Economy of Development and Underdevelopment (N.Y.: Random, 1973)
p. 110-117.
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Here I am referring to Lenin's Imperialism CN.Y. International Pub
1039) see, especially Chapter VI.
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Amin, Op. Cit., p. 5-6.
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Thus, in such an unequal international division of labor, structured in
the appropriation and expropriation by the center of surpluses generated in
the periphery it seems that the development of autonomous capitalism in the
periphery would not be possible, unless the situation that made the subju¬
gations of the now underdeveloped nations by capitalist imperialism are
recreated, ie, new nations to subject, to exploit, to enslave, to dominate,
etc. The only choice then for third world nations is between capitalism
and continuous underdevelopment on the one hand, and on the other hand
between socialism and self-reliant development. But if the constraints
to capitalist development seem insurmountable and the choices are limited,
why then is the conflict with imperialism for a NIEO? Samir Amin gives
some insight about the nature of the conflict:
In the past, the bourgeoisie of the peripheries had
clased with imperialism. The transition from the
first to the second phase of imperialism was not
'planned' by the monopolies: it was imposed by
national liberation movement through which the
bourgeoisie of the peripheries won, aginst imperi¬
alism, the right to an industry. But, ...the
industrialization strategy pursued during this
second phase transformed the relations between
the bourgeoisie of the peripheries and the mono¬
polies. The monopolies, the peripheral bour¬
geoisie ceased to be national and became the
subordinate ally of imperialism by joining in the
new division of labor. That ally is now rebelling
and demanding new terms for this division of labor.
It does not thereby become 'national', since its
demand is located right at the heart of the system;
but it is rebelling all the same. If that rebel¬
lion were to succed, it would simply inaugurate a
new phase of imperjglism characterized by a new
division of labor.
This new international division of labor when fully emerged would mark
the beginning of a new phase of imperialism (as the crisis of the "second





economic order") with a new form of dependency and a new relation between
the bourgeoisie of third world and the bourgeoisie of developed capital¬
ist countries. These factors put together would result in a new interna¬
tional economic arrangement that would increase the expansion of capital
and lessen the source of conflict between the bourgeoisie of the center and
the bourgeoisie of the periphery. By "using the instrument" of foreign
controlled investment, such an arrangement would increase the capability
and capacity of MNCS to penetrate more and more underdeveloped markets
and detail their interests more and more from their home markets. At the
same time, capitalists from both the center and the periphery would be
"able to diversify their portfolios internationally through the interna-
30
tion capital market." As a result of this tendencies, the above factors
would facilitate the development of "an international capitalist class
(the most likely candidates for this class would be the bourgeoisie of
OPEC and the bourgeoisie of developed capitalist countries) whose interests
lie in the maintenance of the world (capitalist) economy as a whole and as
a system of international private property which allow free movement of
31
capital between countries."
Thus so far our main contentions have been the following: that reform¬
ism would not lead to a genuinely international economic order. Secondly,
that the vision of autonomous capitalist development in the periphery is
highly improbable and thirdly, that the present conflict between imperial¬
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lead to a new form of dependency and imperialist domination, l^at then
would be the Impact of this new international division of labor on third
world peoples? Or can a NIEO geared toward export of raw materials by
third world nations and the acquisition of advanced technologies lead to
self-reliant development that would liberate the majority of third world
peoples? From all the evidence available: the militancy of the third
world nations for a NIEO and from most of the literature by both bourgeois
scholars and by the left for a NIEO, the assumption is that a NIEO within
the International capitalist framework would lead to changes in third
world societies. In other words, the case for a NIEO assumed "that re¬
distribution of world resources toward the poor countries will also bene-
32
fit poor peoples in poor countries." In respect to this Johan Galtung
points out that the NIEO "when fed into the societies" of third world
nations will increase inequality and worsen the economic situations of
the majority because "raising of living standards at the bottom are mea-
ures that belong to the domain of domestic policies, and will have to be
solved domestically, making measures from the outside in this direction,
33
...intervention into internal affairs," This, in effect means that
the problems of underdevelopment discussed in the previous chapters can
only be solved through a radical structural transformation of the socio¬
economic system of the societies of third world. Harry Magdoff puts it
more forcefully:
The changes advocated by NIEO, even if by some miracle
they were adopted, would not overcome the improverishment
of the masses, backward agriculture, distorted industrial
and economic structures subserviet to the metropoles,
32
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illiteracy, inadequate education and health services, and
all the other ills that beset these societies. Solutions
for such problems can only arise from internal changes
in class power leading to a revolutionary alteration of
social priorities which elevate the interests of the
masses to the paramount position.
The observation of Magdoff and Galtung, and also of my own normative
assumption that the problem of development is for all practical purposes
a national problem help to reveal one of the principal contradictions of
third world demands. While on the one hand the demand for a NIEO recog¬
nizes the constraints within the international system dominated by imperi¬
alism and proclaimed that self-reliant development is the ultimate goal,
on the other hand it dimisses the notion of disengagement and the arguments
for radical rearrangment of internal class relations and development stra¬
tegy. Yet, when one looks beyond the rhetorical excesses of the collec¬
tive action of third world nations we notice that the socialist countries
of the third world (e.g. Cuba, Vietnam, Algeria, North Korea, Tanzania,
Sri Lanka to mention few) "did not develop their present Internal struc-
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ture because of Improved terms of trade or similar international measures."
Instead, the changes they have experienced took place as a result of
internal struggle and in most cases against "extremely adverse external
36
conditions." This is not to imply that improved terms of trade and/or
the rearrangements of the asjnnmetric international economic relations
would not enhance their genuine efforts to liberate their people from
misery and poverty. My contention is that because of the internal struc-
34
Magdoff, Op. Cit., P. 11
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tural transformation that has taken place in those countries, they have
instituted mechanisms for redistribution of income and for whatever bene¬
fits that may accrue from rearranging international economic system to
the majority of their population.
But in societies like Nigeria or Brazil which have become theaters
of multinational corporations and neo-colonial of the first order, and
where the power of the market prevails over value, capital over labor and
demand of luxury goods over the scarce wages available, there is no doubt
that a NIEO will Increase inequality and worsen the condition of the mass¬
es. The reason for this is that in those non-socialist third world coun¬
tries there are no mechanims for redistribution of income and surplus
generated in those societies. (For example, see income distribution
figures in table 18 statistical appendix) In societies like Nigeria and
Brazil, the surplus generated by more than 80 percent of the population is
appropriated by the 10 to 20 percent of those at the top along with imperi¬
alism. The surplus that come from outside either in form of foreign aid or
37
a NIEO is also appropriated by those at the top. For example the editors
of Monthly Review report in the February issue, 1979, that in Iran the
Shah's family "have an interest in 17 banks and insurance companies,...
80 percent ownership in the nations third largest insurance company, 25
metal enterprises, 8 mining companies, 10 building materials companies,
23 food companies, 26 enterprises in trade or commerce,... 70 percent
ownership of the hotel capacity of the country, ...10 percent of G.M. Iran"





The situation in Iran explains the class composition in third world
nations. Whether it is in Iran with the Pahlevis and Bazaaris or in
Saudi Arabia with the Sheiks or in Nigeria with the Commanders, the "al-
hajis," the chiefs or the civil servants the national bourgeoisie, the
property owners and imperialism are the main appropriators of surplus
generated in those societies. Not only are surpluses appropriated, the
national bourgeoisie and the property owners usually expropriate these
surpluses into Swiss banks and several other financail institution in
the center without reinvesting in their societies. And when investments
do take place either directly by MNCs or joint ventures it is usually in
extractive sector which employs less than 2 percent of the active popu¬
lation and export more than 90 percent of their total output, or in
luxury good industry which would not benefit the masses, but promising
large and quick profits for MNCs.
This analysis of the class structure brings us to the role and types
of the state in third world countries. For the purpose of this study, I
shall identify three categories of them. The first category is the
socially progressive third world countries "where the colonial or neo¬
colonial state has been smashed and a new state created - a new stated
based upon, and reflecting the transfer of power to workers, poor pea-
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sants, and the most oppressed sections of the population," Here the
preconditions for genuine self-reliant development are being instituted.
38
H. Magdoff, "Is There a Noncapitalist Road?" Monthly Review Vol 30
No 7 (Dec 1978) pp. 1-7
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This includes an attempt to sever relationship with the international capi¬
talist system, or at least to reduce dependence on the system; elimination
of economic domination by the institution of capitalist imperialist, and
a radical redistribution of politico-economic power through the rearrange¬
ment of class alliances and the expropriation of private property in
major sectors of the economy. In some of the countries in this category
a social revolution paid for in blood and water have taken place. The
social revolution has led to the destruction Cor would lead to the destruc¬
tion) of the colonial and neo-colonial institutions, and in its place new
institutions are emerging. Countries like Cuba, Mozambique and Vietnam
represent this group. There are others within this group where social
revolution in the "classical" sense have not take place, but whether as
a result of idealism or sympathy with the masses - the ruling class has
opted for socialist self-reliant development. Tanzania, Guinea, Sri
Lanka and many of the East European countries fall into this group. In
this category that we are discussing *k long and complex class struggle,
involving at different times and various forms of temporary class alliances
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and compromises and a great deal of trial-error experimentation" continues
There is the second category of third world countries " in which,
despite anti-imperialist action and grandiose promises and slogans about
socialism, the prospect for socialist transition are unlikely to emerge.
In these countries the old state, built under colonial and neocolonial
conditions, has not been smashed and the oppressive internal class struc-
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identified, among others, "Nkrumahs Ghana, Nasser’s Egypt, Syria, Iraq,
4 i
Burma," and one way include Libya. In these countries the precondi¬
tion for genuine socialist self-reliant development have only been limit¬
ed to the politico-ideological spheres. This include "a radical shift
in class power...from the traditional ruling class (compradors of foreign
capitalist, big landowners, monopoly business, and bankers) to an alliance
based on various segments of the middle class (rich, peasants, traders,
small industrialist, professionals, upper-echoelon civil servants, and
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military officers),’’ nationalization of major sectors of the economy
and their expropriation by the new middle class that has emerged. Because
of contradictions of being anti-imperialist on the one hand, and anti¬
social revolution on the other, these countries tend to purse a strategy
of development which accommodates the existence of an exploiting indigen¬
ous class structure and the international financial institutions of
imperialism. The other characteristic of countries in this category is
that they become more dependent on foreign investment and the financial
institutions of imperialism, surpluses generated in the economy remain
at the top, the peasantry and the masses of the people remain oppressed
and subjected to superexploitation. The only new phenomenon in these
countries is the emergence of a new class structure which differ from the
classical colonial or neocolonial class structure, and from typical
class structure we find in the advanced capitalist countries. Inspite







of society and alliance with imperialism,
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There is the third category of third world countries in which, neither
a social revolution or a radical shift in class power has taken place. In
this category, we find, among others, Nigeria, Brazil, Kenya, Zaire, Ivory
Coast, the Arab oil producing countries with the exception of Iraq, Syria
and Libya, the post-Nkrumahs Ghana, and Mexico. In these countries the
class structure and institutions built under colonial and neocolonial
conditions remain intact. In some of them political independence and a
bankrupt policy of indegenization have led to the emergent of a full-fledge
national bourgeoisie whose Interests lie in the preservation of the national
and the international capialist economy. The limited anti-imperialist
actions and the slogans about socialism found in the second category of
third world countries do not exist here. Whichever strata of the nation¬
al bourgeoisie (military or civilian) is in control of the state, the
state is the means to accumulation of wealth and the control of the major
sectors' of the economy. Agrarians and several other economic reforms
which are the characteristic features of the second category of third
world countries do not exist here either. Needless to belabor ourself
about the characteric features of these countries as we know them from
historical experience.
The problematic I am trying to resolve here is that for the socially
progressive third world countries, that is, those in the first category,




Harry Magdoff did not identify a third category but I think that this
category must be identified and analyzed because the class structure in
countires like Nigeria or Zaire or Kenya do not fall in the same category as
say Libya, Iraq, Syria, Nkrumahs Ghana and Nasser's Egypt, Congo-Brazavllle.
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the appropriation of surplus from within the country and from outside the
country. But for countries of the last two categories especially, the
third category of third world countries a NIEO would only put more wealth
into the hands of the ruling class through expropriation of surplus from
the masses, and from the international economic system. The reason is that
the precondition for redistribution of wealth, the institutions favorable
to such distributions and the strategy of development which could accommo¬
date capital accumulation, production, investment, and a centralized system
of distribution of essential materials and capital goods are not available.
This analysis of the class structure and of the role and types of
state in third world countries as we have attempted to do in the above
few paragraphs, and a reexamination of the premises (some of which I
have pointed out in chapter three) which accompany the demand for a NIEO
reveal an aspect of the third world national bourgeoisie's ideology, that
is, of being anti-imperialism (and not anti-capitalism) on the surface
while leaning strongly towards reformist illusions that oppose revolu¬
tionary transformation of society. It is also an aspect that challenges
the international politico-economic relations, but leans strongly toward
rearranging these relations by way of participation rather than under¬
mining them. Hence their demand for a NIEO had become a demand made for
a greater share of responsibility in decision-making powers and for a
45
reclassification of their status.
There is also an aspect of what Lenin called "power fetishism." As
a result of third world bourgeoisie's role as the intermediate class between
the third world peoples and imperialism, there has been a strong tendency
45
N. Poulantzas, Classes in Contempary Capitalism, (C. Bristol:
Western Printing Inc., 1975) p. 29].
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to ascribe to international institutions a neutral force whose role is that
of arbitrating between the rich nations and poor nations. Hence, the
misconception that participation in the decision-making process in imperia¬
list institution like IMF constitute shift of power in the international
system.
The case of OPEC is a good example of this misconception, when one
examines the literatures on OPEC and its activities, all we are left with
is that the ability of OPEC to set prices and quantities of o;^.l marked a
significant shift in power relations not only between OPEC and MNCs but
46
also between OPEC and developed capitalist countries. The fact is that
OPEC does not control marketing and refining and secondly, oil Ceven
though its elasticity of demand can not be compared to other third world
products), is still subjected to market fluctuations of the center. This
was evident in 1974-75 when as a result of the recession in advanced coun¬
tries the production of oil dropped. Thirdly, it has been revealed that
the nuclear energy industry and the oil industry in developed capitalist
countries are interested in keeping OPEC price high because the higher
the price of OPEC oil the higher the profit of the oil industry and the
more the government will invest in the nuclear energy industry. Which
means that the fate of the so called oil power of OPEC will one day come
to be determined in the west.
To further appreciate the impact of thejyramid class composition in
third world nations and to determine whether a NIEO would make any diffe¬
rence in the non-socialist third world countries we shall now recapitulate
and consider some of the evidence being presented about the future of third
46
For example see C. F. Bergsten, "The Threat from the Third World"
in Foreign Policy 17 Winter 1974-75, and J. Howe, "Power in the Third
World" in Journal of International Affairs Vol 29 No 2 CFall, 1975)
PP. 113-127.
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world countries. In a recent study of underdeveloped countries bjr Tbe
World Bank, the experts concluded that "no single set of measures in the
field of trade, aid or internal development policy can restorpL the growth
of poor countries to something like the U.N. target in the immediate
47
future." Similarily, Jaghdish Bhagwati and P. Rosenstein-Rodan in
their studies of the economy of the world in the ygars ahead have noted
that the present high growth rate in developed capitalist countries would
be sustained with,...income per head rising from the present $4,000 to more
48
than $9,000 by the year 2000. for the underdeveloped countries the
study observed that the income per head will not grow fast enough to
ensure minimum life for the majority of the population. While "the
underdeveloped countries with 65% of world population, had 15.3% of world
GNP in 1965; with 77.5% of world population they are likely to have 18.3%
of world GNP in the year 2000" Rosentstein-Rodan notes that this widening
gap between the developed and the underdeveloped economies will create
a situation where the year 2000 will find the underdeveloped world as large
49
island of misery surrounded by wealth. Rosenstein-Rodan then goes fur¬
ther to argue that underdeveloped countries must attain a 6 percent rate of
growth in the years ahead or face stagnation.
There does not seem to be a choice between doing a
little more. On the contrary, there is an Imperative
necessity to either reaching the minimum quantum of
Investment and growth (say, 5-5.5% in the 1970s and
47
J. Amuzegar, "The North-South Dialogue," Foreign Affairs Vol 54
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J. Bhagwati, Economics and World Order; From the 1970s to the 1990s
(N.y.: Free Press, 1972) p. 31. The income per head for USSR and the
socialist countries is also projected to be as high as those of the developed
capitalist countries by the year 2000. At the present the world trailed




6-6.5% later on) or else embarking on a completely
different road, either of adopting a totalarian
system or of sacrificing the increase in income for
the sake of increasing employment,
Although one may take issue with Rosenstein-Rodans economic growth as
a sufficent instrument for measuring development, his observation help to
explain future trend, and also to strengthen our argument that there is not
amount of reformism of the international politico-economic system that
will change the present situation in the underdevelop world. Thus, the
urgent issue for third world nations, especially, the non-socialist coun¬
tries is between capitalist underdevelopment or^ socialist self-reliant
development. This is not to imply that the socially progressive third
world nations are free of the swift Impact resulting from the international
capitalist system.
The experience of the past few years has shown that the socially
progressive countries and the non-oil producing nations of the third
world are more vunerable to the swift Impact than the OPEC. For example,
in 1974 the non-oil producing countries of the third world total earnings
were 11.3 billion while the cost of import was $19.4 billion, a deterio¬
ration of 8.1 billion. The U.S. surplus with the same group of countries
in 1974 was 2 billion, but with a trade deficit of 8.8 billion with OPEC.
For the non-oil producing countries, oil imports alone cost them 7 billion
in 1973, 10 billion in 1974 and a projection of additional 3 billion per
year in the years ahead. Food imports for India between 1973 and 1974




96 to 210 million; Tanzania's doubled from 60 to 150 million, and Chile's
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doubled from 116 to 230 million.
This record increase in food imports was due to the increase in the
price of food products and fertilizer produced in the developed capital¬
ist countries. After the quadrupled price of petroleum in 1973 the price
of fertilizers jumped astronomically. The price of urea, the main fert¬
ilizer used in underdeveloped countries rose from $50 per ton in 1972 to
$280 per ton in 1974. An increase of more than 560 percent in two years
According to African Development report in December 1974, a Dutch export
leader in fertilizers produced a ton of fertilizer at $30 in 1973. By
1974 this jumped to $300 a ton. A United States based corporation, one
of the leading producers of fertilizer in the world, increased its pro-
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fit from $7.6 million in 1971 to $24.4 million in 1973.
But the situation had changed even for the OPEC countries.' by the end
of 1977. As a result of the recession in developed capitalist countries
in 1974-75 oil production in all OPEC countries with the exception of
Iraq which increased at 17.1 percent had dropped. For Saudi Arabia pro-
ducation dropped at 16.5, Venezuela 26.2 percent, Nigeria 20.7 percent
Kuwait 18.2 percent, Algeria 4.9 percent, Libyan, 0.7 percent and with
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less than 5 to 6 percent for the remaining OPEC members. By the end
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J. Howe, "Power in the Third World" Journal of International Affairs
Vol 29 No 2 (Fall 1975) p. 121.
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African Development (Dec 1974) p. 26
53
W. G. Tyler, Issues and Prospects for the New International
Economic Order, (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1977) p. 63.
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of 1977 t’le- nations has registered $2 billion deficit to the U.S. only
(see table belov.)
Table 13 *
Financial Transactions Between the
United States and OPEC Countries
1974 to 1977 Combined
Money Moving from the
United States
U.S. Puchases of
Goods and Services $106 bil.
Total $106 bil.









Total $ 108 billion
The problems of third world nations socially progressive or otherwise
result from their dependence on the international capitalist markets.
Even though economic issues and development priorities differ among under¬
developed nations, they are conditioned by developed capitalist countries
and underdeveloped countries relations. In other words, by the interna¬
tional economic order. This is why the demand for a NIEO is a crisis of
imperialism. Between those who benefits from imperialism and those who
are exploited by imperialism
As the crisis resolve's itself before our naked eyes, imperialist
rivalry will intensify, the clash between capitalist imperialism and
socialist self-reliant development will also be intensifed. At the
same time solidarity between third world nations will dwindle as the "pro-
54
blematic of sub-imperialism" will become more relevant. Given these
tendencies, a new international division of labor will emerge which would
54
Amin, Op. Cit., p. 20
*Source Reproduced from Monthly Review, Vol 30 No 8 (Jan 1978) p. 9.
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"suit the bourgeoisies of OPEC and the non-socialist third world nations"
55
and the monopolies of the developed capitalist countries."
But, the social contradiction of third world nations will be intensi¬
fied: the agricultural sector will remain stagnant and the food problem
gets worse, the establishment of production base for the export industries
is postponed, income gap between poor and rich nations widen, the poverty
and misery of the people increased, third world regimes would become more
repressive and resistance of the people would increase etc.. In such a
situation, "the political condition may evolve in a direction favorable
56







PROSPECTS FOR THE THIRD WORLD
My main objective at the beginning of this study was to examine the
relationship between international economic order, imperialism and un¬
equal development. In doing so, I postulated that International econom¬
ic order either past, present or yet to be inaugurated is the principal
Imperialist vehicle for domination and exploitation of the third world.
I then proceeded historically and logically to explain the evolu¬
tion and structure of the international economic order. In d-'°''us-
sion I defined international economic order as the economic arrangements
that govern international political economy relations. These economic
arrangements were funded and structured at the end of the second world
war under the hegemony of U.S. The emergence of this structure led to
the consolidation of the postwar international division of labor. An
international division of labor that was based on import-substitution
industrialization and a form of dependency based on export trade and
technological dependency. I also indicated that the postwar interna¬
tional economic order with its four functional areas: trade, aid, in¬
vestment policies and monetary system functions within the framework of
IMF, IBRD and GATT. These institutions, as I tried to demonstrate
became the major promoting and accelerating factor of imperialism.
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In chapter two, I discussed the development of private foreign invest¬
ment, the evolution of the shift from portfolio investment which charac¬
terize the European capitalism to direct foreign investment which accom¬
pany the evolution of American or modern imperialism. I observed in the
analysis that foreign investment is the most powerful link between imperi¬
alism and underdevelopment. This important role of foreign investment is
derived from the fact that it operates through MNCS. And given the monop¬
oly power of MNCS over scientific knowledge, technology and technology
production, foreign and local capital, industrial production and manage¬
ment, raw materials supply and demand, trade flows, the functioning of
the monetary system, etc., foreign investment has become the most effec¬
tive means for expropriating economic surplus from the third world. This
economic drain of potential surplus is carried out through the transfer
of inappropriate technology, the flow of capital from the underdeveloped
to developed countries through high rate of return on investment, over¬
pricing and underpricing of technology and goods.
The analyses in chapter three show that third world postwar develop¬
ment crises are the major factors that precipitated the demand for a NIEO.
Some of the factors include the collapse of the U.N. development decades,
the failure of import-substitution to stimulate industrial growth, the
failure of the "Green Revolution" to stimulate agricultural and food
production, the continuous deterioration in terms of trade and the finan¬
cial burden placed on raw materials exporting countries, the increase in
the external financial debt and debt service, the increasing dependency
on western technology and financial sources, the increasing frustration
of third world peoples and the danger it poses to the ruling class, etc.
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In chapter four, I examined the contents and form of the U.N. decla¬
ration for the establishment of a NIEO. The examination reveals that the
developed capitalist countries are not in favor of a NIEO because of
their short-run economic needs e.g. rising unemployment, continuous infla¬
tion, retarded rate of growth, etc. It shows that third world nations
demand for a NIEO was based on the assumption that the postwar interna¬
tional order is the major obstacle to their development. Some of the
major highlights of the proposal for a NIEO include: the demand for trade
stablization, increasing the volume and improving the terms of official
development assistance, facilitating the process of industrialization in
underdeveloped countries through Investment and the transfer of technol¬
ogy, elimination of tariff and non-tariff restrictions affecting third
world exports, etc.
In chapter five, I examined what has been referred to as the princi¬
pal fruits of the NIEO since the U.N. declaration in 1974. They are the
Jamaica reform of the IMF, the UNCTAD IV Conference in Nairobi and the
Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC). The an¬
alysis indicates that the three forums did not agree on the implementation
of any aspect of the proposal of the NIEO. What the three conferences
achieved was more declarations and creations of bureacratic structure de¬
signed to explore areas of cooperation between developed and underdeveloped
nations.
I then evaluated the impact of the international economic order on
third world development and the implications for international politico-
economic system. The evaluation reveals two important points: that the
demand for a NIEO which is dependent on negotiations and consensus of the
advanced capitalist countries can only be achieved at their acquiesence.
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Secondly, if as a result of the long-term interests of advanced capitalist
countries some of the demands are implemented, it would not lead either
to autonomous capitalist development or socialist self-reliant development
in third world.
This is why the slogan about self-reliant development which accompany
the demand for a NIEO is nothing more than "the ideological justification
of the impossible claim that a development by progressive stages within
the world system of unequal division of labor ought to lead to economic
1
independence." My discussion in chapter five about the differences in
the development stages which characterize the historical evolution of
capitalism in the center and the periphery testify's to the Impossibility
of this claim. Thus the slogan of self-reliant development which accom¬
panies the demand for a NIEO means that the third world dominant classes
are not against imperialist exploitation but wanted to become the domi¬
nant exploiters. They are not Interested in being a junior partner but
wanted to become an equal partner of capitalist Imperialism and in the
exploitation of peoples. According to Samir Amin:
a genuinely self-reliant development is necessarily
that of the people, because externally-propelled
development in all phases of evolution of the imperi¬
alist system effectively benefits the priviledged
dominant classes which make an alliance with the
monopolies. Conversely and as a corollary, a popular
development can only be national and self-reliant for
1
Samir Amin, "The NIEO" Monthly Review Vol. 29 No. 3 (July-Aug, 1977)
p. 16.
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in order to serve the mass of the peasantry, industri¬
alization must first be made to concentrate on improv¬
ing rural productivity. Similarly, in order to serve
the urban masses, it is necessary to give up luxury
production for the local market and give up exploiting,
since they are both on the production of a cheap labor
force.^
It is as a result of this reasoning I argued in the previous chapter
that the Implementation of the NIEO would not enhance the development of
third world peoples.
The reason is that a NIEO within the setting provided by the interna¬
tional capitalist system will only result in a new unequal division of
labor. This new unequal economic arrangement will be based on increased
flow of raw production materials from the periphery to the center and
processed industrial products from the center to the periphery. By so
doing, the economic arrangements will strengthen the following factors:
the expansion of the infrastructure needed for the continued export of
raw materials, a continuation of industrialization process geared to ex¬
port, the importation of sophisticated technologies geared to the produc¬
tion of luxury goods and the strengthening of local capitalism by encour¬
aging Industrialization within the setting provided by MNCS. These
tendencies; the tendency to increase the flow of raw production factors
from the center to the periphery and processed materials from the periphery
to the center and the tendency of local capitalism to unlimited accumula¬
tion and expropriation of potential surplus will intensify the exploita¬




increase the growth and accumulation of useful knowledge, and the trans¬
formation of knowledge into final output via technological and scientif¬
ic innovation in the advanced capitalist countries and the growth of
dependency of the underdeveloped nations.
This is why the conflict on a NIEO which has now been bogged down
into Issues of trade, raw materials supply and demand, monetary policy
and transfer of technology will only facilitate the growth of export-
oriented development. And given the nature of externally-propelled dev¬
elopment it will not provide the production base that will generate
enough resources to meet the needs of the general population. The reason
is that the structure of production in export-oriented development usual¬
ly contains "elementary operations designed only to assure the profita-
3
bility of enterprises competing on the world market." ...The profita¬
bility that is assured through production that utilizes infrastructures
controlled by MNCS and the cheap labor pool available in the underdevel¬
oped nations. Hence, the process of economic development within the
framework of the NIEO would not have the potential to abolish unemploy¬
ment, poverty and the deproductivizatlon of the people in the third world.
It might have the potential of absorbing a small part of the hundreds of
millions of unemployed, but this would be for the lowest possible wages.
The consequence of this would be for the majority of the unemployed mass
4
to sink beneath, the position and condition of an Industrial reserve army.
3
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The above observations helped our earlier contention that no amount
of international redistribution of resources will change the economic
backwardness of third world peoples. The obstacles, in addition to
these obstacles within the international system is that the pre-condi¬
tions for the elimination of economic underdevelopment have not been
instituted in most of the third world nations. With the exception of
the few socially progressive third world countries, the majority of them
maintains an institutional structure where economic surplus that is gen¬
erated in the economy is expropriated by top 10-20 percent of the popu¬
lation. Thus, for a NIEO to have any impact, especially on the econo¬
mics of the non-socialist third world countries, and internal structural
transformation must take place. Such socio-economic transformation must
involve the reorientation of development strategy toward a socialist
self-reliant development. Only such a radical approach to economic
development in the non-socialist states and the continued effort toward
the realization of socialism in the socially progressive state of the
third world will determine, in the words of Rosenstein-Rodan, whether
the underdeveloped nations will become a large Island of misery in the
years to come or not.
If a NIEO within the setting described above is unlikely to yield
results that will benefit the general population, the call for a NIEO
then becomes an attempt to deflect attention away from the inability of
peripheral capitalism to eliminate economic backwardness. One is tempt¬
ed to subscribe to this conspiracy theory because both bourgeois and
radical studies have revealed that the international capitalist system
and the present structure of the non-socialist third world states would
not be able to promote a rate of economic development sufficiently rapid
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to provide benefits to the majority of third world population.
I have pointed out the projections of Jagdish Bhagwati and Rosenstein-
Rodan in chapter five. In addition to their observations, the figures in
the tables below by Rosenstein-Rodan and Lev Stepanov give and estimate of
the rate of growth of total GNP and of the per capital GNP of the under-
Table 14
GNP (Billions of 1965 Dollars)
Less Developed World 1965 2,000
Africa 43.9 216
Asia Less Japan 203.4 1,081








World Total 2,116.8 9,662
share of less
developed world 15.3% 18.3%
Source: Reproduced from J. Bhagwati, Economics and World Order, N.Y.; Free
Press, 1972) p. 40.
Table 15
Per Capita GNP (1965 U.S. Dollars)
1,965 2,000
Less-Developed World 135 325
Developed World 1675 5,775
Source: Reproduced from Lev Stepanov, "World Economics and The Worlds
Future" in J. Bhagwati, Economics and World Order, (N.Y.: Free
Press, 1972) p. 108.
developed world in the years ahead. Without taking into consideration the
shortcomings of their projection, either by underestimation or overestima-
tion due to the usefulness of projection on development that is based on
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strict economic growth, their analysis provide a vivid picture of future
trend in the third world.
The picture even becomes gloomier when one contrasts the rate of
growth of the percentage of GNP per annum for the decades ahead to the
rate growth of the past and present decades. As table 16 indicates, the
average rate of growth of percentage GNP for all countries in Africa,
Asia and Latin America in 1985-1995 is 6 percent. When this is con¬




GNP in the Year 2000
















Source: Ibid. p. 42.
first or second U.N. development decades, we will register a slower rate
of economic growth. The reason is that during the first half of the
second U.N. development decade most of the OPEC countries and the more
industrialized countries of the third world recorded growth rate of more
5
than 6.5 percent against an average population growth rate of 2.9
percent or more. And to project that the growth rate of GNP for the third
world nations in the year 2000 would be 6 percent against an estimated
3
UNCTAD Document, (TD/B/642/Add. 1-2/Rev. 1, 1977)p.6.
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population growth rate of more than 3.9 percent is an indication that most
of the third world countries will become an island of misery surrounded by
wealth.
Thus without going into further debate, it seems clear (except for
those who will contend otherwise will have to provide the necessary empir¬
ical evidence) that the NIEO within the framework of imperialism will only
strengthen the dependency of third world nations and aggravate inequali¬
ties in the distribution of income and wealth among rich and poor nations,
and within the poor nations.
Having painted such a gloomy picture, what then is the prospects for
the third world nations?
From the beginning and throughout this study, I have constantly rein¬
forced the argument that contemporary underdevelopment is due primarily to
the incorporation of the present day underdeveloped nations within the
world capitalist system and the continuing economic and other relations
between the developed capitalist countries and the underdeveloped nations.
On the basis of such historical facts one can only conclude that economic
development can only occur Independently of the institutions that have
been blocking development. I realized that this conclusion is probably
one of the most frequently discussed by students of political economy.
Several political economists both bourgeois and the left contend that it
is not possible for third world nations to cut economic links with the
advanced capitalist countries. Whenever this argument is put forward the
Soviet reapproachment with the west and the recent China's "Great Leap
Backward" is cited. However, as Magdoff points out "the question is not
elimination of trade, but the elimination of the extreme reliance on a
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limited type of trade that serves to meet the requirements and conditions
of the ruling nations."^
In this case the problems of underdevelopment today result not from
the action of those third world ruling classes who seek to end imperialism
through a NIEO, but from the inaction of the same class who favors the
continuation of imperialist practices. The realization of the potential
material and human resources available in third world nations can only be
brought about through structural transformation of the socioeconomic
and political institutions
Thus the path to political, economic and cultural development and
the liberation of the people of the underdeveloped nations from poverty,
and economic exploitation lies within the national system and external
to UNO and its agencies.
6




Profile of the Rich and the Poor Nations







1. Population (in billions) 1.1 .1 2.8 4.
2. Percentage of total world
population 27.5 2.5 70.0 100.
3. Birth rate (per thousand) 17 n/a 37 31
4. Death rate (per thousand) 9 n/a 14 13
5. Infant mortality (per
thousand) 25 n/a 125 75
6. Life expectancy (years) 71 n/a 52 55
Economic
7. GNP ($ billion) 4,991 165 632 5,788
8. Percentage of total world
GNP 86.2 2.9 10.9 100.
9. GNP growth rate
(1970-74) 3.6 7.7 5.5 4.
10. Per capita Income (1974 $) 4,537 1,650 226 1,447
11. Investment ($ billion) 1,098 31 114 1,243
12. Per capita investment ($) 100 31 4 31
13. Investment as a % of GNP
14. Exports^ ($ billion)
22.0 18.8 18.0 21.
808 101 134 1,043
15. Percentage of total
world exports 77.5 9.7 12.8 100.
Social
16. Literate population
(in millions) 7.58 18 746 1,522
17. Percentage of population 68.9 18.0 26.6 38.
18. Malnourished population
(in millions) 10 nil 900 910
19. Percentagpof population 0.9 nil 32.1 22.
20. Poorest population in
millions below $100
per capita nil nil 942 942
21. Percentage of population nil nil 33.6 23.
^Includes Western Europe, socialist Europe, N. America, Oceania, and Japan.“Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates
Venezuela, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, and Nigeria are excluded.
"^Includes countries of the third world and China but excludes OPEC members
^Excludes non-factor services.
Source: Reproduced from M. U1 Haq, The Poverty Curtain, (New York: Columbia
Univ. Press, 1976) p. 123.
Table 18
Size Distribution of Income: Selected Countries
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME: SELECTED COUNTRIES
Poor Countries
Bottom 2nd 3rd 4 th Top Top Top GINI
Fifth Fifth Fifth Fifth Fif th Tenth 5% Ratio
1. India (1951-60) 3.7 6.8 10.1 14.7 64.7 (44.0)(32.0) 0.57
2. Mexico (1963) 3.5 6.6 10.8 19.6 59.5 42.1 28.8 0.53
3. Ceylon (1952-53) 4.3 8.4 12.2 18.5 56.6 42.5 32.4 0.50
4. Colombia (1953) (5.0) (10.0) (16.4) 12.2 56.4 48.4 41.6 0.50
5. Guatemala (1948) (5.0) (9.0) (14.8) 15.8 55.4 43.8 34.5 0.48
6. Argentina (1959) 6.6 9.7 12.3 16.8 54.6 41.9 31.8 0.45
7. Barbados (1951-52) 3.6 9.3 14.2 21.3 51.6 34.2 22.3 0.45
8. El Salvadol (1946) (5.0) (10.0) (17.2) 15.7 52.1 43.6 35.5 0.45
9. Puerto Rico 4.5 9.2 14.2 21.5 50.6 (34.0) 22.0 0.44
Rich Countries
1. W. Germany (1950) 4.0 8.5 16.5 23.0 48.0 34.0 23.6 0.44
2. Netherlands (1950) 4.2 9.6 15.7 21.5 49.0 35.0 24.6 0.43
3. Denmark (1952) 3.4 10.3 15.8 23.5 47.0 30.7 20.1 0.42
4. Sweden (1348) 3.2 9.6 16.3 24.3 46.6 30.3 20.1 0.42
5. U.S.A. (1962) 4.6 10.9 16.3 22.7 45.5 (30.0) 19.6 0.40
6. Italy (1948) 6.1 10.5 14.6 20.4 48.5 34.1 24.1 0.40
7. Norway (1950) 5.5 10.4 15.4 23.7 45.0 29.0 18.2 0.39
8. United Kingdom (1951-52) 5.4 11.3 16.6 22.2 44.5 30.2 20.9 0.38
9. Australia (1954-55) 5.6 12.5 17.8 22.4 41.7 27.9 18.9 0.35
Note: Glni Ratios were computed directly from the figures given in the table, including
the bracketed figures which were estimated by rough Interpolation to make up for
missing data.
Source: Reproduced from J.N. Bhagwatl, Economics and World Order: from the 1970s to the




Returns on Foreign Investments Transferred
by the Third World Countries in 1964
(in millions of $U.S.)
Argentina 103 Iran 456
Brazil 189 Iraq 331
Chile 106 Saudi Arabia 370
Colombia 73 U. A. R. 18
Mexico 324 Turkey 42
Peru 72 Total for these Middle
Puerto Rico 212 East countries 1,217
Venezuela 653 India 211
Other Latin Amr. Countries 238 Malaysia 67
Total Latin America 1,970 Pakistan 55
Philippines 25
Ghana 18 Others, not including
Ivory Coast 25 certain countries
Libya 200 (notably Indonesia) 19
Nigeria 69 Total (Incomplete) for
Rhodesia 54 South and East Asia 377
Zambia 97
South Africa 235
Others, not including Recapitulation
certain countries
(notably Congo- Latin America 1,970
Kinshasa) 50 Africa 748
Total (incomplete for Middle East 1,217
Africa) 748 South and East Asia 377
Total Third World, except-
certain countries 4,312
Est. total of all the
Third World 4,900
Source: Reproduced from P. Jalee, The
York: Monthly Review, 1969) p-





Balance of External Exchanges of Underdeveloped Countries
( Excluding Oil-producers) , 1960-67
Value
(million dollars) Percentage of Imports
1960 - 4,800 18.5
1961 - 6,400 24.0
1962 - 6,200 22.5
1963 - 5,100 18.0
1964 - 5,800 19.0
1965 - 6,500 20.0
1966 - 7,000 20.0
1967 - 8,500 24.0
Source: Reproduced from C. Legum, The First U.N. Development Decade and
Its lessons for the 1970s, ( New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970)
p. 31
Table 21
General Development of Foreign Trade, 1948-67











(milYfon per cent ofdollars) imports
1948-54^ 17,200 4.4 18,200 3.9 -1,000 5.5
1954-60^ 22,300 3.6 22,900 4.8 - 600 2.5
1960-67^ 27,500 5.4 30,300 4.9 -2,800 9.0
1960 27,500 6.0 30,300 10.0 -2,800 9.0
1961 27,500 0.5 31,100 2.5 -3,400 11.0
1962 29,100 5.0 31,600 1.5 -2,500 8.0
1963 31,700 9.0 32,500 3.0 - 800 2.5
1964 34,700 9.5 35,900 10.0 -1,200 3.5
1965 36,500 5.0 38.200 6.5 -1,700 4.5
1966 39,100 7.0 41,000 7.5 -1,900 4.5
1967 39,800 2,0 42,200 3.0 -2,400 5.5
^The values are based on data referring to the beginning of each period.
Source: Reproduced from C. Legum, 'The First U.N. Development Decade, (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1970) p. 2.
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